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ABSTRACT 
Rebecca J. Crosthwait 
Department of Anthropology  
University of Kansas 
2007 
Migrants from Michoacán, Mexico, have journeyed north to work in the United States 
for around 150 years, creating lives and maintaining connections “here” and “there.” 
Mexican national and subnational levels of government have actively institutionalized 
transnationalism.  Michoacanos, who number around 2 million in the U.S., are one 
focus of recent government policy changes toward migrants. This paper proposes that 
the concept of a transnational (subnational) state best fits Mexico’s historical, 
economic, and political situation.  It provides a structure for conceptualizing a 
transnational state and evaluates Michoacán’s transnational activities within this 
framework. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 A blonde girl in a navy blue polo shirt ushered me to the registration line, 
asking–with a distinctive Mexican accent–if I had preregistered.  I couldn’t help but 
wonder if she was a michoacana, a daughter of immigrant parents, or like me, an 
“American mutt,” with a penchant for all things Mexican, who had learned taco-stand 
and quinceañera dance Spanish.  Throughout the Cumbre de Comunidades Migrantes 
Latinomericanas (Summit of Latin American Migrant Communities), I was struck by 
the fluidity with which many of the cumbre participants moved between worlds. They 
move between worlds that to me seem disparate, but to them represent the border-
transcending “home” created and sustained by individuals, communities, and in some 
cases certain levels of government.   
 Fittingly, Morelia, Michoacán, hosted this first international cumbre:  the 
city’s streets are witness to Michoacán’s culture of migration.  Just out of the city’s 
centro, grocery stores and auto parts shops with names such as Aborrotes 
Indianapolis and Refaccionaría Detroit line the narrow streets, symbols of the 
transnational movement of people, skills, and money.    
 Yet, the exhibition area of the cumbre suggested more complex levels of 
transnationalism in Michoacán.  Tables showcased michoacano hometown 
associations (HTAs) from California and Chicago; Western Union and Construmex; 
Michoacan’s chapter of PROBEM, the binational migrant education program; 
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retirement villages aimed at return migrant clients; special investment and banking 
opportunities for migrants and “por los que quedan” (for those who stay); special 
production prospects, such as hydroponic greenhouses (with special financing) and 
consulting for nopal (edible prickly pear cactus) production; government agencies 
such as the Instituto Michoacano de los Migrantes en el Extranjero (Michoacan 
Institute for Migrants Abroad); and government matching-funds programs. 
 It was not happenstance that migrant community leaders chose Morelia.  It is a 
reflection on how migrants, policy makers, and academics perceive Michoacán as a 
state with a history and culture of migration and the Michoacán government’s wide-
ranging policies and programs directed at its migrants abroad.   
 Each year roughly 50,000 people are en route to various areas of the United 
States from Michoacán, located in west central Mexico (CONAPO 2002).  
Additionally, another 7,600 return to this strikingly beautiful central breadbasket 
state, which despite lush green hills of pastureland, pine forests, and cultivated lands, 
has become one of the most recognized migrant-sending states in the Mexican 
Republic.    
 Michoacanos leave the avocado orchards, pine forests, and sandal and 
furniture factories in Uruapan, Paracho, and Sahuayo, among dozens of other towns, 
for a variety of places and industries in the United States.  The old agricultural 
circuits from the bracero period continue as active as ever, following a corrida (run) 
that reflects seasonal produce harvest.  Michoacanos involved in agricultural labor 
may start in southern California at the end of the cold season, moving north 
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harvesting asparagus, lettuce, and tomatoes, arriving in northern California to pick 
grapes, strawberries, almonds, and cherries.  Finally, they finish their corrida 
harvesting apples in Washington (López Castro 2003:21).  Other agroindustry circuits 
include meat-processing cities such as Lexington, Nebraska; Dodge City, Kansas; and 
Marshalltown, Iowa.  Other michoacano migrants are involved in construction and 
the service industry, the arena where most Hispanics work in the United States (U.S. 
Census Bureau 2007).  And they have done this for over 150 years.  Indeed, 
michoacanos embody the “culture of migration.” 
 Michoacanos live in every state of the United States, and between 2 and 2.5 
million, over half the state’s population, are estimated to live outside of Michoacan 
(Modelo de Atención al Migrante Michoano 2004:5). Chicago and Los Angeles are 
renowned for being home to the Michoacan diaspora.1  Michoacanos are also to be 
found in cities large and small, from Anchorage, Alaska, to Cobden, Illinois 
(Anderson 1999; Anderson 2004; Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior 2006).  
Their presence has grown from a few isolated laborers at the turn of the 20th century 
(Fernández-Ruiz 2003) to extensive networks of friends and families and replanted 
Michoacan villages (see Fitzgerald 2000 for discussion of "Little Sahuayo" in Santa 
Ana, Calif.).  Indicators of Michoacan in United States communities range from ¡Viva 
Michoacán! (Long Live Michoacán!) emblazoned on truck rear windows to 
paleterías (ice cream shops) named Paletería La Monarca2 (Monarch Ice Cream) or 
La Flor de Michoacán (The Flower of Michoacán) to formal government presence.  In 
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fact, the state government purchased a building in Chicago, Casa Michoacan, from 
which to direct its transnational projects in the Midwest United States.   
 When scholars have recently discussed the idea of a transnational nation-state 
(Robinson 2001), they usually speak of a  “transnational state.” But I will use 
“transnational nation-state” to refer to a country’s government and “transnational 
state” to refer to state–subnational--government.  A prime example of a transnational 
nation-state is the Philippines (Parreñas 2005).  However, despite anthropologists’ 
urging to look to state-level, migrant-aimed politics (see especially Goldring 2002), 
the concept of a transnational state has not appeared in the literature.  
 In this thesis, I attempt to answer the following questions, using Michoacán as 
a case study.  Does it make sense to talk about a transnational state in terms of 
Mexico?  What would it look like?  What are the different levels of government, 
international forces, and migrants involved? 
 To determine how Michoacán can be considered a transnational state, I will 
look at its attitudes, activities, programs, and policies toward its migrants.  First, 
however, I explore the concept of transnationalism in Chapter 2.  In Chapter 3, I 
discuss political transnationalism, the politics of transnationalism, and the 
politicization of transnational migration.  As more and more migrants form 
simultaneous lives across international borders, governments are coming to see their 
roles change and expand.  The institutionalization of transnational processes has 
become an important activity for many governments, including that of Michoacán.  
Here I will also offer a framework for conceptualizing a transnational state.  Chapter 
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4 encompasses a lengthy discussion of the history and political economy of Mexico in 
general and Michoacán in particular, providing a justification for choosing 
Michoacán as a case study.  More importantly, this chapter underscores the role of 
state-level government agency rather than national government.  Two periods in 
particular highlight the “regional over the national” mindset in Mexico and especially 
in the bajío region, which includes Michoacán.  Finally, in chapter 5, I will discuss 
the operational definition of the transnational state more in depth, what the “ideal” 
would look like, and I will assess how Michoacán fits this model.   
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CHAPTER 2 
TRANSNATIONALISM 
 
Navegando, siempre navegando entre 
dos aguas, los migrantes han 
construido todo otro mundo, el suyo 
propio, con retazos de aquí y sobrantes 
de allá, con sus propios reglas de 
conducto y su modo de acción.  Sin 
estar necesariamente divididos entre 
ambos universos (quizá precisamente 
por el omnipresente riesgo de 
fragmentación que representan el 
desarraigo y la relocalización) han 
logrado constituir una comunidad 
extendida, inserta o infiltrada entre los 
resquicios sociales de las entrañas del 
monstruo pero con raíces hundidas 
fuertemente en la tierra materna, casi 
inaprensible de tan dispersa pero 
suficientemente articulada y coherente. 
Navigating, always navigating 
between two waters, migrants have 
constructed an entire other world–
their own, with pieces from here and 
leftovers from there, with their own 
rules of conduct and modes of action.  
Without necessarily being divided 
between both universes (perhaps 
precisely because of the omnipresent 
risk of fragmentation that uprooting 
and relocation represent) they have 
managed to construct an extended 
community, inserted or infiltrated 
between the social openings of the 
monster’s bowels but with roots sunk 
strongly in the maternal earth, almost 
incomprehensibly dispersed but 
sufficiently articulated and coherent. 
(Fernández-Ruiz 2003:35) 
 
“Transmigrants’ concept of ‘home’ is simultaneously 
about roots and routes” 
(Fouron 2003:239, referencing Gilroy 1993) 
 
 Carlo, a recent immigrant from Europe, opened a restaurant to bring his 
cuisine to the rural Midwest and to save enough money to take his new bride back to 
the “Old Country” to meet his family.  He hired Benjamin and Mario, from Mexico 
and Guatemala, respectively, as evening bus staff.  Mario recently received his 
permanent residency, la mica, and travels to Guatemala at least once a year to check 
on the progress of his new house and small stationery store, the construction of which 
his uncle, mother, and sisters are supervising.  Benjamin holds two jobs to earn extra 
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money to help his sister who is in medical school in Morelia.  In addition to the 
restaurant job, he also works at the local meat-processing plant where he washes 
select pieces of meat for export to Japan.  At 7:00 a.m., when Benjamin is just starting 
to pull on his rubber boots, he probably does not realize that a growing number of 
day-trading Japanese women are putting their children to bed and logging into the 
Internet just in time for the opening bell of the New York Stock Exchange. Some of 
these women no doubt dined on beef from the heartland of America, processed by a 
young man from the heartland of Mexico.3   
 Such globalization and transnationalism are reproduced daily in different 
colors, faces, spaces, and circumstances from the largest metropolitan areas (see 
Smith 2006) to the tiniest rincones (corners), such as San Gabriel, Durango, Mexico, 
where the corner-store owner bagged my purchases in plastic sacks appropriated from 
a small-town Colorado Surefine.  In this same town's landfill, I found license plates 
from Fort Morgan and Greeley, beef-processing towns in Colorado.     
 In an attempt to make better sense of the increasingly growing number of 
lives, activities, and processes with links far from “home,” social scientists rapidly 
adopted the concepts of “transnationalism” and “globalization.”  But these labels 
gloss over complicated phenomenon and disclose nuanced issues (Guarnizo and 
Smith 1998:3).  Smith (2006:3) says that globalization and transnationalization have 
“become buzzwords describing how the ‘local becomes global,’ how distant people 
are becoming linked through economic markets, communications, and cultural 
dissemination and homogenization.”   
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 At the outset, it is important to distinguish between the processes of 
globalization and transnationalism because conflating the two similar yet divergent 
concepts leads to indistinct scholarship.  Global processes take place in a space 
decentered from specific territories under the thumb of nation-states (Kearney 
1995:548).  Smith (2003b:300) explains that analysis of global processes--economic, 
cultural, and institutional--tend to examine how changes at a global level transform 
and transfer power.  
 Giddens (1990:64) explains globalization as the “intensification of world-wide 
social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are 
shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa.”  Processes happen in 
local communities and within national territories, but also transcend boundaries.  This 
fact has enormous implications for anthropology because a scope of examination 
limited to local processes and identities provides an incomplete understanding of the 
local (Kearney 1995:547).  This perspective is important in the study of transnational 
labor migration because, as Basch, Glick Schiller, and Szanton Blanc (1994:11) note, 
when we join a global level of analysis with an examination of a particular group’s 
history, we are better able to understand particular labor migrations. 
 Kearney (1995:548) contrasts transnational processes as concomitantly 
“anchored in and transcending one or more nation-states.”  The term 
“transnationalism” has been used in such fields as political science and international 
relations since the 1960s.  These fields identified as transnational any association, 
organization, or interaction that occurs in a created space unbounded by nations (Pries 
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2001:17); therefore, the European Union and the United Nations would be considered 
transnational organizations. Glick Schiller, Basch, and Blanc-Szanton (1992a) stress 
that the seemingly perfunctory, detached, and mechanical flow of goods and activities 
“have embedded within them relationships between people” (Glick Schiller, Basch 
and Szanton Blanc 1992b:11).  Transnationalism emphasizes “the ongoing 
interconnection or flow of people, ideas, objects, and capital across borders of nation-
states, in contexts in which the state shapes but does not contain such linkages and 
movements” (Glick Schiller 2004:449).   
 As my analysis focuses on the movement of people between Mexico, 
specifically Michoacán, and the United States, and the cultural-political effects of 
subsequent unbounded actions, the term transnational is more useful than 
globalization.  Kearney (1995:548) says that  
transnational calls attention to the cultural and political projects of the nation-
states as they vie for hegemony in relations with other nation-states, with their 
citizens and “aliens.”  This cultural-political dimension of transnationalism is 
signaled by its resonance with nationalism as a cultural and political project, 
whereas globalization implies more abstract, less institutionalized, and less 
intentional processes occurring without reference to nations. 
 
 Recognizing the human dimension in transnational processes both grounds the 
issue and gives rise to analytical and methodological questions.  Glick Schiller, 
Basch, and Blanc-Szanton (ibid.) claim that the social relations located in 
transnational flows  
take on meaning within the flow and fabric of daily life, as linkages between 
different societies are maintained, renewed and reconstituted in the context of 
families, of institutions, of economic investments, business, and finance and 
of political organization and structures including nation-states. 
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Therefore, it is the warp and weft of daily life, which is comprised of many factors, 
that embody transnational social fields.  Relationships give significance to 
transnational processes.   
 The study of migration allows a different perspective on transnational 
processes.  Focusing on individuals and families rather than abstract representations 
permits anthropologists to work toward a better understanding of the activities, 
anxieties, and achievements experienced by those whose lives intertwine two or more 
places (Glick Schiller, Basch and Blanc 1995:50). Goldring (2002:59) reminds us that 
as with all emerging perspectives, the rise in transnational migration research calls for 
new theoretical tools and vocabulary for investigating sustained processes of cross-
border migration. 
 
Transnational Migration 
 While “transnationalism” in social science literature often refers to “the 
process by which immigrants build social fields that link together their country of 
origin to their country of settlement” (Glick Schiller et al. 1992b:1), it is best to refer 
to transnational processes, of which transnational migration is one example among 
many, albeit a preeminent, one (Szanton Blanc, Basch and Glick Schiller 1995:684). 
Precursors to Transnational Migration Perspective 
 The idea that immigrants could settle in a new country while keeping close 
ties to their homelands has not been an accepted and widely used concept in the social 
sciences.  Transnational migration does not fit well in “static” models that steered 
earlier dialogue on migrants’ lives. 
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 Early anthropological work on migration set up dichotomies to explain certain 
phenomena.  Rouse (1992:25) points out that for years many understood migration in 
bipolar terms.  This paradigm was informed by Robert Redfield’s work in Mexico, 
which looked at distinct and opposed lifeways, such as those that could be considered 
“traditional” or “modern” (Brettell 2000:102).  With emphasis on the motivation of 
individual migrants, anthropologists separated and opposed sending and receiving 
societies, rural areas and cities, push and pull factors.  This focus on the individual 
can be traced to economic factors; individuals were seen as making rational 
progressive economic decisions.  According to Lewellen (2002:132), “implicit in this 
paradigm is an economistic Rational Man model, with its emphasis on individuals 
calculating the costs and benefits of various options.”  In addition to the focus on the 
individual, this “modernization” theory defined migration as the “movement of 
people from capital-scarce but labor-abundant regions” (Brettell 1996:794).  
Anthropologists believed that migrants would become “agents of change” in their 
home communities through savings, and the differences would dissolve between rural 
agrarian and urban industrial areas (Brettell 1996). 
 The migrant experience was seen as a move between autonomous 
communities, marked by a shift of focus and severing of bonds.  One would 
understand the experience of a bracero (laborer), for example, by examining his 
decision to extend his stay in the U.S., the conditions that drove him to leave, his 
motivations for going to a certain locale, and how he adapted to a new environment.  
Massey, Goldring, and Durand (1994:1499) discuss this understanding of migration 
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with the example of “target earners” from Mexico who go to the United States to earn 
money to pay for a specific expense, such as land or wedding festivities.  They 
usually live in spartan conditions to save money; work long hours, perhaps a couple 
shifts per day; remit much of their money; and do not have much of a social life.  
These migrants continue to see themselves as members of their home community and 
not as participants in the host society. 
 While the push-pull framework partially explains the reasons for the start of 
migration flow, Grey and Woodrick (2002:366) highlight the theoretical 
shortcomings of such a bipolar theory.  They believe that it emphasizes two areas that 
are allegedly autonomous, without taking into consideration the “complexity of 
regional or national economic structures.”  Additionally, they reveal that a push-pull 
analysis of the migration situation is static and does not explain movement on a large 
scale.  It also does not explain how areas with similar “pushes” and “pulls” may not 
trigger migration.   
 In effect, by entirely (and perhaps sometimes blindly, for want of an 
alternative) embracing a bipolar framework, social scientists have been unable until 
recently to more fully understand migration in practice and how it changes in light of 
global changes.  Rouse (1992:26-27) asserts that the emphasis on a bipolar 
framework has concealed people’s real migration experiences behind an antiquated 
and insufficient system of understanding. 
 Another deficiency of the push-pull model is that its focus is centered too 
much on the individual.  In reality, decisions to migrate are made not merely by one 
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person, but by households, even extended families.  Furthermore, the migration of 
one individual can create waves of migration.  Massey, Goldring, and Durand 
(1994:1496) note that migration in a community can become a “self-reinforcing 
process that acquires an internal momentum all its own.”  As a family or community 
becomes more networked, migration “becomes increasingly independent of the 
conditions that originally caused it” (ibid.).   
 Glick Schiller, Basch, and Blanc-Szanton (1992b:6) maintain that social 
scientists did not recognize that many migrants hold on to their relationships and 
activities at home, “not in contradiction to but in conjunction with” settlement away 
from home.  They believe this was because social scientists, holding on to a more 
Geertzian view of culture, studied migrant experiences as discrete, stable, and 
historically and spatially stable acts in different areas of the world, rather than as a 
global phenomenon.  In contrast, pioneers in the study of transnational migration 
tended to have a broader, more Tylorian definition of culture; as encompassing 
“social structure, and trans-generationally transmitted patterns of action, belief, and 
language” (Glick Schiller 2004:451).  Furthermore, Wimmer and Glick Schiller 
(Glick Schiller 2004:454; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003) attribute social science’s 
tunnel vision to “methodological nationalism,”  which is the incapacity or 
unwillingness to “observe and think beyond the borders of the nation-state (Glick 
Schiller 2004:454).   
14 
New Phenomenon or New Perspective? 
 Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt (1999) warn that before using new terminology 
it is important to establish that a phenomenon is sufficiently unique and insufficiently 
explained by other preexisting terms.  Scholars debate whether transnational 
migration is merely a novel perspective for something that has been happening for 
many years or whether it is a new occurrence.  Robert Smith (2006:8) says 
immigrants to the United States in the 1800s were involved in several types of 
transnational practices, from political activities to religious movements that 
transcended borders.  Pries (2004:4) and Portes (2003) agree that transnationalism is a 
novel perspective rather than a new phenomenon. 
 Most scholars, while acknowledging past transnational activities of migrant 
populations and sending communities, believe that while not a new phenomenon, 
migration today is taking on new characteristics.  Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt 
(1999) note that transnational ventures were fewer and farther apart in the past 
because technology did not allow for nearly effortless long-distance communication.  
 Before the advent of modern telecommunications and jet airplanes, 
communication and travel between migrants’ different “homes” was expensive, time 
consuming, and arduous.  Immigrant civic organization leaders could not easily travel 
to their community of origin to check on how migrant-funded projects were being 
handled.  Today, in the span of just a weekend, a Mexican hometown association 
(HTA) leader can fly directly from any number of cities in the United States to 
several Mexican cities, conduct business with community leaders, and even digitally  
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record monetary transactions for proof of transparency.  Daily contact would have 
been nearly impossible a hundred years ago, and even a few years ago, there were 
few cost-effective options for communication to more remote parts of the world.  
Today, it is not merely the foreign dignitary or business person who can have instant 
access to partners abroad; a michoacano day laborer working in rural Illinois can text 
message or chat via the Internet with family and friends in his home village. Fax 
machines, the Internet, telephones, and airplanes are “space- and time-compressing 
technology” (Portes et al. 1999:224), and the rate and extent of transnational activities 
are directly related to the access a group has to these technologies.  
 Transnational migration is tangled up in global capitalism. The movement of 
labor does not make sense outside of the global scene, where capital and goods flow 
(relatively) freely (Basch et al. 1994:22).  The global economy has prompted the 
emergence of new transnational spaces that in previous eras were either not necessary 
or unavailable to migrants. “Given the current conjuncture of global capitalism, 
newly created transnational spaces are sites at which new and multiple identities are 
fashioned and a variety of old and new forms of power and domination are exercised” 
(Szanton Blanc et al. 1995:684).    
 
Migrants 
 Pries (2004:10) classifies migrants into five types: 1) emigrants and 
immigrants; 2) return migrants or sojourners; 3) recurrent migrants; 4) diaspora 
migrants; and 5) transmigrants.  The terms “immigrant” (one who comes to an area) 
and “emigrant” (one who leaves an area) bring to mind images of rupture, breaks 
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from the past and home, and the distress of living in a new context where old ways 
are seen as deficient (Glick Schiller et al. 1992b:1; see also Handlin 1951).  Return 
migrants always have “home” on the horizon and may go back because of economic, 
or legal (immigration) failure, or because they have achieved the goals they set for 
their stint as migrants.  A shuttle or recurrent migrant may migrate following 
agricultural seasons, usually staying less than a year in the destination and 
maintaining strong ties with the area of origin, always identifying as separate from 
and different than the host country.  The motivating force for diaspora migrants is not 
economic, but rather religious or political; usually diaspora migrants are forced to 
move and disperse.  The definition of a transmigrant is more amorphous.   
Transnational Migrants 
 If transnational migration is the “process by which immigrants forge and 
sustain simultaneous multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies 
of origin and settlement,” then a transmigrant is an actor in this process (Glick 
Schiller et al. 1995:48).  As opposed to the first four types of migrants, transmigrants’ 
identities and actions challenge the bipolar framework traditionally used to 
understand migration processes.  These migrants’ experiences are not cut and dry--
leaving one country and settling in another (Fitzgerald 2000:5). 
 Rather than mere “nostalgic imaginings” of home (Glick Schiller et al. 
1995:56) transmigrants' everyday lives are marked by constant construction and 
maintenance of relations spanning national borders.  They may live in the country of 
origin for many years, even gain full legal citizenship, yet continue to develop and 
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nurture multiple cross-border links.  These may include familial, economic, social, 
organizational, religious, and even political bonds (Glick Schiller et al. 1992a:ix).   
 Transmigrants are agents in the creation, configuration, and continuation of 
their nation-state-spanning relations.  Examples of migrant-led transnational linkages 
include social and familial networks across borders and sending or depending on 
remittances.  These examples help us realize that migrants are not the only members 
of transnational social fields (Glick Schiller 2004:457).  Others may include elderly 
parents who maintain property or businesses or even raise children; nonmigrant 
compadres,
4 government and education officials who may interact within and shape 
the transnational social field without ever venturing across national borders.   Massey, 
Goldring, and Durand (1994:1499) claim that migrants are “inevitably linked to a set 
of nonmigrants through a variety of social ties that carry reciprocal obligations of 
kinship, friendship, and common community of origin.” 
 Transnational migrants can be depicted as simultaneously embedded in home 
and host communities, pursuing activities that span national borders, and relying on 
extensive networks (Jones 1992:219). Furthermore, their identity is noticeably 
indistinct, characterized by the phrase ni de aquí, ni de allá.5  
Simultaneity 
 A transmigrant does not merely shift direction in activities or identity in 
different circumstances.  Transnational migrants construct daily activities with the 
multiplicity of “here and there” (wherever the “here” or “there” may be at any 
particular time) simultaneously.  In a discussion of michoacano migrants to Redwood 
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City, California, Rouse (1992:45) notes that “instead of leaving one community and 
reorienting in another….many settlers developed transnational involvements that 
encompass both.  While they lived in Redwood City, they were also living deep in 
western Mexico” (italics added). 
 Engagement, then, is an overarching process that is not geographically bound.  
Transmigrants “settle and become incorporated in the economy and political 
institutions, localities, and patterns of daily life of the country in which they reside” 
(Glick Schiller et al. 1995:48).  At the same time, they are “engaged elsewhere,” 
conducting business, building connections, organizing, and influencing events locally 
and even nationally in their country of origin.  Rouse (1992:45) describes this 
simultaneity well: 
Through constant movement back and forth, the energetic efforts to reproduce 
involvement across space, and the accompanying circulation of money, goods, 
and services, the municipio, Redwood City and the other settlements in the 
U.S. had been woven together so tightly that, in an important sense, they had 
come to form a single community spanning the various locales…a 
“transnational migrant circuit.” 
  
Also employing a fabric metaphor, Glick Schiller (2004:457) says that the 
transnational model for understanding certain migrations 
directs attention to the simultaneity of transmigrant connections in two or 
more states.  It allows ethnographers to operationalize and investigate the 
ways in which transmigrants become part of the fabric of daily life in their 
home state or other states and participate in their forms of nation-state 
formation, while simultaneously becoming part of the workforce, contributing 
to neighborhood activities, serving as members of local and neighborhood 
organizations and entering into politics in their new locality. 
 
While simultaneity is the form of transmigrants’ experiences, activities are the 
content. 
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Activities–Social, Political, Economical 
 Migrant-led transnationalism typically begins with network building and 
sending remittances to the family.  Subsequently, migrants may create hometown 
associations with quite distinct ends in mind.  Mexican hometown associations, for 
example, often begin as social clubs that plan functions such as dances to raise funds 
for patron-day festivals or the repatriation of the dead.  With time, these hometown 
associations may conduct infrastructure projects such as paved roads, potable water, 
or rodeo rings.  Changes in technology have made it cheaper and easier to keep in 
touch with home communities, “thus facilitating remaining actively involved in 
community life of one’s place of origin” (Goldring 2002:62).  Thus, migrants today 
can with increased facility remain active in their communities of origin through use of 
cellular phones, instantaneous wire transfers, fax machines, and the Internet. 
 The transnational migrant experience is made up of activities that promote, 
generate, and preserve such simultaneous relations.  These actions are a “forging and 
sustaining” of “multistranded social relations that link societies of origin and 
settlement” (Glick Schiller et al. 1992a:ix).  These activities may simply be sending 
money to family members.  However, transmigrants may participate in improving 
living conditions in their home communities, building entertainment facilities, 
contributing to political campaigns from abroad (monetarily or otherwise), or other 
transnational processes such as network building and tradition reformulation and 
expression. Here, in the case of Mexican migrants, I am specifically thinking of cinco 
de mayo celebrations, which have taken on new meanings and importance in the 
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United States, thus affecting how this holiday is observed in some areas of Mexico 
where there is a high rate of migration. 
 Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt (1999:218) include activities such as informal 
import-export businesses as transnational activities.  For example, a Mexican 
transmigrant woman who sells used clothing she bought at garage sales in the United 
States in Mexico, then brings back Mexican cheese to sell to her migrant friends in 
the United States, is involved in an informal transnational business activity.  This 
activity links her nonmigrant connections in Mexico (cheese makers or store owners) 
with her migrant connections in the U.S. (who may not have the means, legal or 
economic, to travel to Mexico).  Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt (1999:218) also list 
campaigns of home country politicians among their expatriates as an important 
transnational activity.  As we will see, Mexican politicians have increasingly 
campaigned in the United States.  Such activities do not happen in isolation, and 
while individuals are definitely actors, they act in association with other individuals. 
Networks 
 A network of transmigrants does not emerge suddenly.  Wiltshire (1992:182) 
says that migration represents, to some families, a cutting of ties; however, “for the 
majority it represents the creation or reinforcement of a mutually interdependent 
support network which is neither bounded by the household nor national boundaries.”   
 First migrants from a community have a future of more risks, costs, and 
danger than successive migrants, who quite literally follow in their footsteps.  From 
Mexico, most vanguard migrants were neither exceptionally poor nor more well off–
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they had enough capital to fund a major journey north but still had needs that 
promoted taking the risk.  Massey et al.’s (1994:1500) account lays out the 
development of migrant networks well: 
As migrants make successive trips, they accumulate foreign experience and 
knowledge that render ties to them increasingly valuable.  As information 
about the destination country and its socio-economic resources accumulates in 
the population, the costs of migration steadily drop to make the cost-benefit 
calculation positive for an increasingly large set of people, while the risk of 
movement steadily fail to render migration a feasible risk-diversification 
strategy for a growing number of households.  Over time, therefore, migration 
becomes progressively less selective and more representative of the 
community as a whole. 
 
Grey and Woodrick (2002:367) also claim that social or familial relationships 
between current, former, and potential migrants lead to a decline in costs and risks of 
migration and an increase in the odds of success.  Migrants’ social capital of networks 
increases as migrant networks deepen and broaden--more migrants add their 
knowledge, skills and resources to the communal experience. Network members 
(friends, family, friends of family, or family of friends) loan start-up money, give new 
migrants a place to live at first, refer them to jobs, orient them to the community.  In 
essence, they make the potentially difficult transition to a new country less 
complicated. 
 In her research with Oregon farm workers, Lynn Stephen (2003:28) 
encountered an older migrant who personified the process of migrant network 
creation.  His experience reminds us that processes are never isolated and always 
affect subsequent processes, while being affected by others. 
[I]mmigration from his hometown in central Michoacán to the Willamette 
Valley in Oregon has been linked to United States immigration policy.  
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“Legal” immigration through the Bracero Program generated well-rooted 
networks that expanded after the program ended.  This same phenomenon was 
repeated in 1986 when the United States granted legal residency to 2.8 million 
immigrants through the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) 
and over 1 million undocumented farmworkers were legalized through the 
Special Agricultural Worker (SAW) program.  Once legalized, their 
undocumented relatives often joined them. 
 
 Networks are particularly important for those who are unable for one reason 
or another to enter the United States legally.  Fitzgerald (2006:285) notes that social 
networks help “circumvent state controls because they are conduits through which 
experienced migrants provide new migrants the money and information needed to 
cross the border illegally.”   
 With intensity and duration of migration, these networks come to comprise 
what Massey et al. (1994: 1500) call “transnational circuits--social and geographic 
spaces that arise through the constant circulation of people, money, goods, and 
information.”  These transnational migration circuits are “distinct societies” that 
begin to “have a transformative influence on each other” (ibid.).  Understanding these 
networks that link sending and receiving communities is vital for understanding 
migration, including migrant identity, more fully.   
Transmigrant Identity 
 Identity in a transnational context can seem muddled.  Transmigrants may be 
“at home” here and there, but are simultaneously “ni de aquí, ni de allá.”  Glick 
Schiller, Basch, and Blanc-Szanton (1992b:4) argue that transnational migrants’ 
identities potentially change during the migration experience because they arrive with 
“certain practices and concepts constructed at home….[and] engage in complex 
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activities across national borders” that generate and form identity.  Therefore, 
transmigrant identity is “multivalent,” comprising many levels and nuances (Goldring 
2002:59) because “transmigrants draw upon and create fluid and multiple identities 
grounded both in their society of origin and in their host country” (Glick Schiller et 
al. 1992b:11) 
 Kearney (1995:558) claims that transnational identities are not characterized 
by “either-or” dichotomies but are more defined by “a logic of ‘both-and-and’ in 
which the subject shared partial, overlapping identities with other similarly 
constituted decentered subjects that inhabit reticular social forms.”  He advances a 
model of transmigrant networks that is decentered yet interconnected, like the Internet 
or the human brain.  These networks shape transmigrants’ identities in a way that 
does not call for a shedding of the old and cloaking with the new.  Rouse (1992:41) 
points out in his research that transmigrants neither abandoned the perspective gained 
from their past and home nor did they decisively hold on to old identities out of 
nostalgia.   
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CHAPTER 3 
TRANSNATIONALISM AND POLITICS, POLITICAL TRANSNATIONALISM 
 
Because every immigrant is also an emigrant.   
(Legain 2006:8) 
 
 In the last two decades, sending countries such as Mexico, have begun to 
recognize the significance of the concept of transnationalism, leading them to imagine 
their states “to exist wherever their emigrants have been incorporated” (Glick Schiller 
et al. 1995:51).  Kearney (1995:547) claims that leaders and factions now look at their 
diasporas not as lost social capital and labor, but as a global resources and 
constituencies.  Consequently, governments have launched initiatives and legislation 
to manipulate transnational processes for their benefit, constructing new concepts of 
nations and nationals abroad, and hoping to profit from transmigrants’ successes.   
 
Of Nations, Nation-states, and Nationalism 
 Understanding the politics of transnationalism presupposes understanding of 
the concepts “nation,” “nation-state,” and “nationalism.”  Benedict Anderson 
(1991:6) defines a nation as “an imagined political community….both inherently 
limited and sovereign.”  Members of a nation, according to Anderson, have a “deep, 
horizontal comradeship” (ibid.:7).  The constituents of the nation, nationals, feel 
strong ties to each other, despite any actual inequities or exploitation; they declare a 
shared history, ancestry, identity, culture, and traditions.  Hackenberg (2000:467) 
reminds us that a group of people can consider themselves a nation, in spite of where 
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they live:  “We may find them dispersed in space, perhaps residing in enclaves, 
perhaps not, but claiming uniform ‘nationality.’” The concept of “nation” is more 
ambiguous than the state, which is the civil government (i.e., political organization) 
that has “sharply defined territorial borders” (Fitzgerald 2004a:229).  The nation-state 
thus is the sovereign state that governs people who imagine themselves as one people.  
Nationalism, according to Glick Schiller and Fouron (2002:356), is the array of 
“beliefs and practices” linking nationals and national territory.  They argue that the 
issue of territory is vital to understanding nationalism.   
Central to nationalism is the belief that a nation has the right to control the 
territory that is the homeland by having its own state, whose territorial 
boundaries stretch to the borders of the homeland.  Therefore, it is difficult to 
speak of nations without also discussing states (ibid.). 
 
The Nation-state and Nationalism in the Context of Transnationalism 
 In light of transnational processes, the nation, rather than being contained and 
bounded by the state, becomes a “porous container of multiple criss-crossing, 
intersecting flows of different peoples and cultures” (Min-hsi Chan 2003:97).  
Therefore, there is a more flexible perception of “nation” from a migrant-sending 
country (Smith 2003a).  Given this change, we witness politicians from around the 
globe claiming to be leaders of global nations.  Mary Robinson, president of Ireland 
(from 1990 to 1997), declared herself the leader of the global Irish (Levitt and Dehesa 
2003:587).  Despite repercussions that he may have experienced from United States 
politicians in 2000, then-presidential candidate Vicente Fox said he was looking to be 
the president of all 118 million Mexicans, which included the 18 million Mexicans 
living in the United States (Smith 2003b:330) In fact, some political parties, leaders, 
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and other groups go beyond lip service and claim their dispersed populations as 
resources.  Political leaders see migrants as political resources and have taken steps to 
urge Mexicans in the United States to call their U.S. congressional representatives to 
support issues that Mexico favors, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) in the early 1990s (Fitzgerald 2004b:527). 
 Transnational migrants do not act out their transnational identities in a 
vacuum.  Fitzgerald (2000:9) notes that although most social scientists accept the 
notion of a nation as an imagined community or invented tradition, the public and 
policy makers usually operate with an “essentialized conception of nationality” at the 
forefront of their minds.  Therefore, Glick Schiller, Basch, and Blanc-Szanton 
(1992b:15) urge us to appreciate that transnational migrants are embedded in “nation-
ness.”  “Transmigrants exist, interact, are given and assert their identities, and seek or 
exercise legal social rights within national structures that monopolize power and 
foster ideologies of identity” (ibid.).  Both migrants and politicians play a role in the 
project of transnational-nation building.   
Role of the Nation-state 
 Adhering to Appadurai’s (1990, 1991) belief that transnational processes have 
discounted the importance of, and practically supersede the role of, the nation-state, 
many social scientists have disregarded anything but the most local of politics (except 
in critiques) in their study of transnationalism.  For example, Glick Schiller, Basch, 
and Blanc Szanton (1992), believing that global capitalism is the main force driving 
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transnationalism, fail to notice that governments play an active role in producing 
transnational fields.  Guarnizo and Smith (1998:8) declare that  
far from withering away in the epoch of transnationalism, sending states once 
presumed to be “peripheral” are promoting the reproduction of transnational 
subjects; and, in the process reinventing their own role in the “new world 
order.”   
 
 Taking Alvarez’s (2006:36) definition of the nation-state--“the result of 
ensembles of practices composed of …‘a fluid and dynamic constellation of people, 
practices and ideas’”--transnational processes indeed can be influenced and 
manipulated by the hand of government at all levels. Migrants’ activities can be seen 
as pressures on their home government, while government responses to these 
activities and pressures also constitute part of the ensemble.   
In the Footsteps of Migrant-led Transnationalism 
 Guarnizo and Smith (1998) emphasize the dichotomy of “transnationalism 
from below” and “transnationalism from above.”  Above I focused on migrant-led 
transnational processes.  Transnationalism from above is distinguished by the 
involvement of nation-states and subnational governments, international 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and political parties (Goldring 2002).   
 In many cases, transnationalism from above follows on the heels of 
transnationalism from below.  Migrants usually live simultaneously in distant areas, 
have activities and networks that span international borders, and have identities that 
reflect something of “here” and “there” long before governments take heed of the 
large-scale implications of transnational processes.  When the “powers above” realize 
that power and legitimacy may be areas of contention in the wake of migrant-led 
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transnational processes, politicians and leaders may gradually propose 
institutionalization of policies to expand their reach.  
Institutionalization 
 Goldring (2002:64) broadly defines nation-state-led transnationalism as those 
institutionalized policies and programs that extend the arm of the nation-state’s 
“political, economic, social, and moral regulation to include emigrants and their 
descendants outside national territory.”  Governments in migrant-sending countries 
essentially become more imaginative.  They perceive their nation–the imagined 
community–to exist anywhere on earth that their emigrants settle (Glick Schiller et al. 
1995:51) and they conceive of policies and programs that will bring the entire nation 
within the fold.   
 Institutionalized transnationalism can be categorized into three groups: 
economic, political, and cultural.  Each faction, party, government, or NGO has a 
different transnationalism toolkit, which may include, according to Goldring (2002) 
and Levitt and de la Dehesa (2003:589), attempts to track, assist, or channel 
remittances; policies aimed at bolstering investment and funding; support of 
emigrant-aimed cultural or education exchange programs; advertising of home 
country tourism6; public decrees about emigrants’ worth to the country; legislation 
allowing dual nationality or citizenship, voting rights or rights to run for office; and 
the extension of protection and services to migrants. 
29 
The Transnational Nation-State 
 Some migrant labor-sending nation-states7 have so embraced the 
institutionalization of transnationalism that they may be called “transnational nation-
states.” 8  Glick Schiller and Fouron (2002:359) note: 
A number of emigrant sending states...have adopted policies that turned them 
into transnational nation-states.  Many have changed their laws and created 
government agencies to ensure that transmigrants remain incorporated in their 
native land.   
 
The concept of a transnational nation-state, a country’s civil government extending 
beyond its geopolitical boundaries, has become a significant notion of late.  
Governments have realized their ability to adapt to emigration by influencing how 
migrants manage their connections to their origins from their place of residence. 
 Transnational migration and other processes of globalization require us to 
reexamine many of the long-presupposed political classification systems.  Several 
decades ago talk of a transnational nation-state would have been absurd.  Today the 
state’s ability and responsibility to provide services for its members, collect revenue, 
channel opinion, and enforce behavior look different, take place differently, and can, 
in fact, transcend international borders.  More than being mere transnational policy, 
which would entail policies involving two or more countries, a transnational nation-
state exists beyond its historically recognized geopolitical boundaries.   
 Glick Schiller (2004:460) notes that it is the sending countries’ political 
leaders who labor to make and shape transnational nation-states, “but there are 
significant differences in the degree to which and the ways in which migrants have 
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responded to these state projects.”  Issues of corruption, transparency, and migrant 
goals and autonomy may become obstacles for the transnational nation-state. 
 The presence of the nation-state in transnational social fields can be “hyper-
present” or “hyper-absent” (Glick Schiller 2004:456).  A hyper-absent nation-state 
may attempt to wield power from behind the curtain, using legislation and agreements 
relaxing “regulatory mechanisms” in realms such as financial markets, production, 
and communication.  A hyper-present transnational nation-state makes its activities 
apparent, while not necessarily being utterly transparent in its motives.  It decides 
who are citizens and denizens, and who can consider themselves members of the 
nation.   
 
The Debates 
Citizenship  
 Citizenship is simply “membership in a political community” (Oldfield, 
quoted by Fitzgerald 2000:12). Smith (2003b:302) claims that citizenship is the 
complex of “ties and relations between categories of persons and states, where these 
are in theory mutually enforceable and in general respected by other states or 
enforced by international treaties.”   
 In the vernacular, there may not be much difference between a national and a 
citizen.  However, in the context of political transnationalism, the distinction between 
the two is key.  Nationality is the “formal legal status of state membership” while 
citizenship “delineates the character of a member’s rights and duties within the 
national polity” (Levitt and Dehesa 2003:594).  Dual nationality permits people to be 
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members in two nation-states; however, it does not promise the rights and privileges 
of citizenship--those benefits typically are the right to vote and hold office.   
 Generally, there are two levels of citizenship: legal and cultural (also called 
substantive or moral citizenship).  Levels of citizenship are dynamic, ever changing.  
Fitzgerald (2000:11) notes that citizenship levels vary from “full enjoyment of civil, 
political, and social rights” to mere symbolic membership with none of the 
aforementioned rights.  Participation affects level of citizenship.   
 According to Stephen (2003:29), cultural citizenship is the model for 
understanding how migrants “can be recognized as legitimate political subjects 
claiming rights for themselves and their children based on their economic and cultural 
contributions, regardless of their official legal status.”   Cultural citizenship does not 
hinge on holding the correct immigration documents.  Rather, migrants’ “concrete 
contributions to the community” argue louder for respect and protection (ibid.:31-32).  
Because of and through participation in transnational activities, transmigrants–
especially hometown association leaders–work to increase social citizenship 
privileges (Goldring 1998:3).  Through exercising elevated social status as active 
migrants, imparting upon their home communities part of their fiscal or social capital 
gained abroad, they are “exercising status as leaders, a social status generally 
unavailable to them” either in their home community before migrating or in the 
receiving country, where they may be considered “the bottom of the racial order” 
(Glick Schiller et al. 1992b:3).   
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 When migrants invest in their home communities, they increase their 
arguments for claims to legal citizenship.  Citizenship enables migrants, as indicated 
by Smith (2003b:303), to take part in “democratic, formal state institutions, such as 
voting, to have the chance to participate directly in governing and to gain control over 
state resources.”   However, legal citizenship does not depend totally on migrant 
participation.  The sending nation-state, in creating “economic conditions to 
encourage investment” (Fitzgerald 2000:109), also creates space for migrants–if they 
choose to respond with substantial investment–to fortify claims to legal citizenship.  
 There are differing ideas about extraterritorial citizenship, all anchored in the 
importance of steady, substantive participation in public life in the home community.  
Fitzgerald (2000:78) argues that “political participation cannot be a right without 
commensurate public duties.  Because migrants are physically outside the polity, it is 
impossible to coerce them into fulfilling their duties.”  Therefore, migrants have 
power to shape their citizenship.  At the same time, sending states are confirming 
their continued existence by endorsing the creation of and supporting “bifocal 
subjects”–persons with dual nationality or citizenship and multiple identities 
(Guarnizo and Smith 1998:9). 
 The definition of citizenship is a highly contested matter among scholars.  
Transnational migrants in reality have a voice in this matter because, as indicated by 
Fitzgerald (2000:25), although most citizens do not have a choice about their 
citizenship, “extra-territorial citizens are removed from the coercive apparatus of their 
home state.”  When transnational migrants’ relationships with their home countries’ 
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reach a substantive point, they may begin to feel they are fulfilling their citizen 
responsibilities but not receiving adequate citizen rights.   
 Nation-state governments also have reason to reassess migrants’ membership.  
According to Smith (2003a:727), 
[S]ending states tend to redefine their relationships with their diasporas when 
they experience a major reconfiguration in their relationship with which 
emigrants are seen to have become potentially or actually of greater 
importance. 
 
Who’s Dealing the Cards?: The Resistance-Cooptation Debate 
 As migrants increasingly act across borders and push for amplified political 
rights and recognition, actors from above clamber to resituate power within their 
reach.  Figuring out who holds the cards in the transnational game can be a 
complicated task.  Nation-states’ institutionalization of transnational policies and 
programs opens up “interstitial social spaces” (Guarnizo and Smith 1998:9) where 
both migrants and governments have new opportunities for power brokering. 
Transnational activities can offer migrants possibilities for “resistance” to power from 
above, whereas institutionalization presents ways for governments to co-opt migrant 
power.  Goldring (2002) notes that simply asking if nation-state–migrant relations are 
top-down or hegemonic is short-sighted–the issue is, in fact, much more complex.     
 Some claim the role of the nation-state has been discounted as a consequence 
of transnational processes.  However, Goldring (2002:69) says it may appear that 
nation-state-led transnationalism, such as in the case of Mexico, has led to the nation-
state “holding the balance of power, limiting transmigrants’ autonomy, power, and 
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participation.”  Thus, the transnational nation-state is seen as centralized, hegemonic, 
co-optive. 
 Migrant-led transnationalism, however, seemingly allows migrants increased 
autonomy.  Fitzgerald (2006:264) claims that “citizens outside of the country largely 
escape the state’s ability to extract their resources or discipline them for criminal 
infractions.”  To control its people, the nation-state must be able to monitor its 
members to police, tax, or draft them.  Migrants abroad are beyond the reach of the 
nation-state.  In the case of Mexico, several processes have limited attempts at the 
establishment of the Mexican transnational nation-state: an established culture of 
migration and dependence on remittances, among other factors.   
 Both sides seen, it is in fact better understood to think of nation-state-migrant 
relations as  
a set of negotiations in which the national government has more power and 
resources but in which transmigrants can make significant gains and help to 
shape the terms of their membership in the nation (Goldring 2002) 
 
Rather than keeping the discussion on the abstract level of general migrants and 
nation-states, we would do well to look more closely at the governmental actors to 
see which levels are involved in “transnationalism from above” and at smaller scales 
of territory to understand the effects of institutionalization.  
Importance of Territory 
 While I have argued that transnational migrants do not merely have a 
nostalgic longing for home, but rather have actions and identities that span borders, 
we must not ignore emotional ties to “home.”  While the concept of home is fluid and 
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can come to incorporate not only a migrants’ natal home, but also the place where 
they grew up, settled, or raised their children (be it home or abroad), “home” is still 
“where the heart is.”  Anderson (1991:14) reminds us that nations command 
“profound emotional legitimacy”–people and places are held close to the heart. 
 Smith (2006:9) claims that today’s migrants’ identities are tied up with their 
country of origin, “whereas migrants a hundred years ago might have identified 
themselves more strongly with their home village.”  However, this may not always be 
the case.  Goldring (1999:163) notes that Mexicans tend to tune their lives to their 
place of origin, not necessarily their country of origin.  Transnational migrants send 
money to family members located in certain places, organize to participate in 
productive projects in their communities of origin, and return to specific areas, not 
just a broad region or country.  Activities are based mainly on membership and 
identities that are “constituted as more ‘local’ than national” (Goldring 2002:64).  
Likewise, as I will more fully expose in Chapter 5, specific subnational levels of 
government have several hands in the transnational process.   
 Within transnational studies, there is much talk of the deterritorialized nation-
state.  However, this idea fails to recognize that territoriality “is a defining dimension 
of the nation-state” (Smith 2003b:301).  In Mexico, state-led transnationalism 
involves bringing emigrants into the fold, but due to situations that will be discussed 
in the following chapter, it depends largely on “provincial and municipal authorities 
and transmigrants for implementation” (Goldring 2002:55).  Accordingly,  
the state government remains the principal connection 
between…transmigrants and the Mexican state.  The federal government 
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offered symbolic market membership in the nation, but it is at the state and 
municipal levels that club and federation leaders participate actively.  
Transmigrant dollars together with political and economic crises have 
motivated political authorities to expand membership in the nation, state, and 
local communities to assure the endurance of social and economic ties to 
Mexico (ibid:94). 
 
Goldring (ibid.:70) claims that the notion of a transnational nation-state discounts the 
role of transmigrants, their organizations, and subnational politics.  For this reason, it 
is important to look to the crucial and dynamic role of the subnational state in 
institutionalized transnationalism and its distinctive relationship with its emigrants.  
Although often forgotten in social science literature–passed up for the seemingly 
more significant “transnational nation-state”--it is necessary to contextualize 
transnationalism “in terms of subnational processes, linkages, and identities” 
(ibid.:92).    
 The increasing political involvement of transnational migrants in their home 
states and municipalities and the increasing involvement of subnational governments 
in the institutionalization of transnational processes, while being an overlooked area, 
is a locus for a different conceptualization: the transnational state.  A transnational 
state is one that takes into account its migrants through high intensity of legislation 
for and implementation of policies and programs directed at the economic, political, 
and social aspects of the lives of its emigrants.  Through state-level policies that span 
national borders, states may be transnational if, in the absence federal policies, or 
through allocation of responsibilities from the federal to the state level, they pass 
legislation and secure the participation from migrants.    
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 The diagrams in Figure 1 represent the situation of the transnational state.  
The first diagram situates the transnational state at the intersection of the 
institutionalization of economic, political, and sociocultural activities.  A state may 
institutionalize one type of activity while disregarding others, but only when all three 
types of institutionalized activities converge is it a transnational state.  The second 
diagram represents the preconditions for the emergence of a transnational state.  The 
transnational state appears when state-level legislation captures migrant participation 
in the absence of federal policies or when federal policy is to allocate action to the 
state level.  When one of the conditions is missing, the circumstances do not lead to 
the materialization of a transnational state.  For example, without migrant 
participation, state legislation leads to no end.  If the federal government is not absent 
or does not in effect relegate action to the state level, no state action will carry legal 
weight. 
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FIGURE 1: COMPONENTS OF THE TRANSNATIONAL STATE
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CHAPTER 4 
CONTEXT AND  JUSTIFICATION FOR THE STUDY OF A MEXICAN TRANSNATIONAL 
STATE 
 
In addition to struggling to define their relationship to 
both the Mexican patria and the United States, 
immigrants have long expressed an active interest in 
identifying with particular regions of Mexico, the 
patrias chicas (small homelands) that they have called 
home.  
(Tulchin and Selee 2003:312) 
 
Desperation is the raw material of drastic change.  William S.Burroughs 
 
No me critiquen por que vivo 
Al otro lado. 
No soy un desarraigado. 
Vine por necesidad 
Ya mucho años que me vine de 
mojado. 
Mis costumbres no han cambiado, 
Ni mi nacionalidad. 
Don’t criticize me because I live 
On the other side.   
I’m not uprooted.   
I came out of necessity.   
It’s been many years since I 
came as a “wetback.”  
My customs haven’t changed,  
Nor my nationality. 
Los Tigres del Norte, "El Otro Mexico" 
 
 If we pause to ponder the history, politics, and economics of Mexico, it is 
evident that talking of subnational transnationalism in Mexico is not only viable but 
also crucial for the understanding of migration politics in North America.  Several 
factors have contributed to subnational institutionalization of transnationalism: 1) 
“the regional” in Mexico has historically wielded its autonomy against “the national”; 
2) the politics and economics of the neoliberal revolution have placed the states of 
Mexico in a position with more responsibilities and smaller budgets; 3) the extremity 
and profundity of migration from certain regions of Mexico, coupled with the 
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politicization of transnational processes have obliged some states to nestle into their 
own niche on the transnational stage.   
 
Regional versus National 
 Since even before Mexico gained its independence in 1821, regional powers 
met attempts to unify the Mexican nation with reticence or outright obstruction.  
Creating a national power from disparate regional governments was problematic; 
agreeing on a constitution for the new country was not easy, as there were compelling 
arguments from strong-minded folk for a decentralized government. After Mexico’s 
independence, the former colonial units continued to act as individual countries, 
patrias chicas (little homelands), until Mexico City exerted its dominance (Rees 
2006:238). Elites in Mexico City feared that Guadalajara would become a “rival 
capital,” surrounded by its own provinces, if the nation did not concede to a federal 
republican system of government in the Constitution of 1824; however, “while 
acceptance of the constitution guaranteed the territorial integrity of the nation, it gave 
an excessive amount of power to the federal states” (MacLachlan and Beezley 
2004:10).   
 In 1836, Santa Ana’s reactionary regime attempted to shift the power balance 
between the national government and the states, drafting a new constitution that 
“provided for regional political bosses selected by the president.  States lost most of 
the independent authority” (ibid.:18).  This centralist regime, under the rule of the 
caudillo (leader) and his subordinates, was not popular with the states of the former 
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republic, which were transformed into military districts with regional caudillos 
selected by the president.  The central governmental gave the president sweeping 
power, but reining in physically distant communities or ideologically distant areas, 
such as the many indigenous areas or Protestant stronghold areas, proved not to be an 
easy task (see Gamio 1916).  Between 1836 and 1846, revolts against the heavy-
handed centrifugal forces of the national government occurred all over Mexico, most 
notably, in Texas (MacLachlan and Beezley 2004; Raat 2004).   
 The patria chica and regionalism are significant in understanding the greater 
importance of regional than national bonds. Cline (1963:89) discusses Mexico’s 
patrias chicas, saying that allegiance to one’s patria chica historically outweighed ties 
to the nation:   
The patria chica almost defies definition.  It is, in general, a group of 
individuals, families, or even villages who have unconsciously formed a 
territorial unit to which they feel bound sentimentally….they form a little 
nation.   
 
Mexico is dotted with many patrias chicas, culturally distinct areas that are ethnically 
and linguistically unique.  In Michoacán, the four geographic areas of the Zona 
Lacustre, the Meseta P’urhépecha, La Cañada de los Once Pueblos, and the Ciénega 
de Zacapu all encompass an example of a patria chica.  Many of the people here 
speak P’urhépecha and identify themselves as distinct from the Mexican populace at 
large.  
 Patria chica patriotism, held on to so strongly throughout Mexico’s history, 
continues today.  Tulchin and Selee (2003:312) say that migrants have expressed 
ardent concerns about the patria chica in the United States, and the 1990s witnessed a 
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“dramatic upsurge” in hometown and homestate clubs in the United States.  In fact, 
the Federación Californiana de Michoacanos’ (Californian Federation of 
Michoacanos) mission statement declares the preservation of the rich P’urhépecha 
culture as the federation’s primary aspiration (Federación Californiana de 
Michoacanos 2007). 
 A whole state may be considered a patria chica, but Cline (1963:89) says that 
the region encompasses another important set of sentiments and traditions.   
The region is larger than any patria chica; it contains many of them.  The 
bonds among its members are less numerous, more tenuous, but in given 
circumstances most members will respond characteristically; they feel a 
certain consciousness of kind, which approaches nationalism….Regional 
loyalties are powerful social and political forces.   
 
 Even though Mexico technically remained a federal republic (after several 
reversions to centralism), its de facto system was centralized, as its political and 
economic resources “have remained heavily concentrated in the country’s capital” 
(Rodríguez 1993:134).  Despite this imbalance of power throughout most of Mexico’s 
history, states have a degree of autonomy.  State governors’  
very real political power and autonomy belie the idea of state governments as 
mere conduits of federal power.  The six-year incumbencies of state governors 
do not coincide with those of presidents, so that in the second half of their 
terms they work with a new president to whom they do not owe their 
selection.  The governors’ relative autonomy from presidential power allows 
them to develop their own state policies (Hernández Chávez 2006:274).   
 
In fact, the power of the central government’s subjugation of the state governments is 
more due to economics than politics.  The state governments are tied to shared 
revenue from the federal government for a large percentage of their state revenues 
(ibid.:275). The federal government controls 80 percent of revenues today, while 
43 
most states “generate less than 10 percent of their own spending” (Rees 2006:238). 
Mexican states have a history of regional exertion of power over the national, even in 
the face of a de facto centralist regime.  Klesner (2006:402) argues the states’ case 
well: 
Providing good government may in cases mean needing to gather more 
revenue in order to be able to offer the services required in Mexico’s 
burgeoning cities, which is difficult because that federal government has 
controlled income and value-added taxes and has sought to use those revenues 
for its own purposes. 
 
Their autonomy is simply curbed by the federal government’s control of the purse 
strings.  We can see, then, why states would be interested in channeling monies 
coming from anywhere–including migrants–into state coffers.    
 These subnational allegiances solidify the argument that it is valid to look to 
the state-level for several reasons, including historical loyalties and governor 
autonomy.  Not all Mexican states, however, are interested in highly institutionalized 
transnationalism.  Those with higher migration indices and greater remittance flows 
will attempt to co-opt transnational activities of migrants and the federal government.   
 
Mexican Migration:  Social, Political, and Economic Structure Transformations  
 An appreciation of the complexities of the politicization of Mexican 
transnational migration entails more than tracking numbers of migrants and places of 
origin and settlement.  To understand Mexican emigration, transnational migrants, 
and institutionalized transnationalism, we must pay attention to the intersection of 
politics, economic environment, and emigration (and the United States’ immigration) 
policies and practicalities.  Massey (2002:50) argues that Mexican’s decisions to 
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migrate have never “been taken in isolation but within larger social and economic 
structure that have been transformed over time.”  Therefore, to grasp Michoacan’s 
institutionalization of transnationalism, we must understand the broader contextual 
history of Mexican, and particularly michoacano, migration, and what economic and 
political episodes have pushed the state government to develop into a transnational 
actor. 
With the exception of a brief hiatus during the 1930s, migration between 
Mexico and the United States has gone on continuously since the dawn of the 
twentieth century….what has changed over time is not so much the fact or 
rate of immigration as the auspices under which it has occurred (Massey et al. 
2002:51)  
 
The history of Mexican emigration is long, basically dating to 1848, when the Treaty 
of Guadalupe Hidalgo created the 2000-mile long border we more or less know today.  
According to Massey et al. (2002:25), because the border area, excluding the Rio 
Grande Valley, was relatively unpopulated during the 19th century, we cannot 
actually “speak of ‘international migration’ between Mexico and the United States 
until the twentieth century.” Yet, following the turn of the 20th century, Mexican 
emigration began to gain the momentum that has made it the focus of countless 
studies, legal debates, and dinner-table discussions on both sides of the border.   
 
Mexico’s Politics, Economics, and Migrant Policies  
After the Revolution 
 The beginning of the 20th century to the 1940s was a raucous time in Mexican 
migration.  Droves of migrants headed north and multitudes were repatriated at the 
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same time.  While Mexico was undergoing modernization, industrialization, and 
revolution, the United States experienced booms, busts, and wars.   
 Massey et al. (2002:31) claim that Mexican migration probably would not 
have started without a demand for labor in the United States.  From the turn of the 
20th century until World War I, enganchadores, indentured labor recruiters, went to 
the Bajío region of Mexico (Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacán, San Luis Potosí, and 
Zacatecas) looking for laborers for the expansion of the U.S. railroad and promising 
high wages and travel money to the American Southwest.  Industrial cities began to 
rely heavily on enganchadores at the outbreak of World War I, as the war created an 
increase in industry and decrease in American laborers (Massey et al. 2002:29).  
Eventually, the U.S. government began worker recruitment programs; however, these 
programs were terminated at the end of the war.  During the Great Depression, 
Mexicans became handy targets to blame for growing joblessness.  In the 1930s, 
federal, state, and local officials launched massive deportation crusades in agricultural 
areas and Mexican enclaves. 
 Mexicans had reason to leave their country.  The first decade of the 20th 
century was the height of the Porfiriato, the reign of President Porfirio Díaz.  Under 
Díaz’s presidency, Mexico shifted from a country dominated by agriculture to one 
focused on industrializing, and 95 percent of campesino (peasant) households were 
landless by 1910.  The Mexican Revolution halted the economy and triggered the first 
and only refugee migration from Mexico to the United States (200,000 immigrants) 
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(ibid.:30).  After the revolution, the country continued its economic growth, but the 
promises of the revolution, namely land redistribution, were simply not fulfilled.   
 Mexican politics had varying responses to emigration throughout this period, 
from attempting to regulate the issue of travel documents (Fitzgerald 2006:264, 266) 
to asking Mexicans in the United States to register at consulates (Fitzgerald 2000:20).  
Mexican federal officials considered mass emigration as an atrocity and publicly gave 
emigrants the label “traitors to the motherland” (Fitzgerald 2006:262).  One consular 
employee referred to the number of native Mexicans living in the United States as a 
“veritable hemorrhage suffered by the country” (ibid.:267), and the massive 
emigration was referred to as “bleeding Mexico white” (Fabila 1991:50). Emigration 
threatened Mexico’s nation-building project because it underscored the economic 
disparity in relation to the United States.    
 Conversely, Mexico favored repatriation.  Fitzgerald (2000:20) notes that the 
Mexican consulate in Los Angeles, citing nation-building motives, was active in 
supporting repatriation and immigration restriction.   Mexican academics and 
government officials, such as Manuel Gamio, saw repatriation as a way to propel 
Mexican modernization. 
 Gamio discussed the advantages and disadvantages of traits taken on and 
changes undergone during a Mexican immigrant’s time in the United States.  He 
believed that in many cases, they were advantageous from the point of view of 
Mexico (Redfield 1929:436-437).  Walsh (2004:134) notes that Gamio saw Mexican 
exiles, emigrants, and repatriates as an important resource for the Mexican 
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government’s nation-building campaign because they “brought with them from the 
United States the industrial work discipline and production techniques….as well as 
exaggerated nationalist sentiments developed in exile.”  Gamio (1969:173) claimed 
that “as a whole, it can be said that the Mexican immigrants are bettered in the United 
States in various ways; but although contact with American civilization is beneficial 
to them and they adopt some of its characteristics, the majority never become 
integrally assimilated to American civilization.”  For this reason, Gamio believed that 
the most advantageous action would be to repatriate those immigrants to improve 
conditions in Mexico.  
 Subsequently, migration plateaued in the mid 1930s.  Fernández-Ruiz 
(2003:40) believes that this absence of growth was due to Cárdenas’s land 
distribution and the nationalization of trains and subsoil minerals, calling these 
actions the “cimentación que sostendría la modernización de México para las décadas 
posteriors” (laying of foundations that would maintain the modernization of Mexico 
for the later decades).  Despite Cárdenas’s start to the “Mexican economic miracle,” 
which lasted nearly until 1970, jobs created in urban areas could not keep up with the 
growing rural population.  Although many rural Mexicans found themselves for the 
first time able to access land, Cárdenas’s agrarian reform did not set aside resources 
for productive projects on the land.  Massey (2002:36) observes that Mexican 
peasants saw the dawn of the Bracero Program as a way to finance production on 
their newly acquired lands. 
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The Bracero Program, 1940s-1960s 
 The 1940s through the mid-1960s witnessed changes in Mexican migration, 
U.S. immigration policy, and Mexico’s attitude toward its emigrants.  Mexico 
recovered much more quickly from the Great Depression than other parts of the 
world, primarily due to Mexico’s reliance on subsistence agriculture rather than 
industrial agriculture, and President Cárdenas’s unconventional policies that sparked 
growth in many sectors (Raat 2004:128).  As with Roosevelt’s New Deal, the 
Mexican government assumed a central role in managing and regulating economic 
life (Massey et al. 2002:34) 
 During World War II, the United States relied heavily on Mexican oil and 
labor.  Moreover, the conscription of able-bodied American men caused a serious 
labor shortage that Mexicans were more than willing to fill.  The war economy 
prompted both the Mexican and United States governments to agree on a new 
program to import temporary manual labor to three distinct arenas:  agriculture, the 
railroad, and mining (Fernández-Ruiz 2003:41).  Raat (2004:152) notes that by July 
1945, there were 110,000 Mexican workers, braceros, working in agriculture and 
railroads. 
 Even though the Mexican government promoted the Bracero Program, 
authorities also complained about who emigrated.  Fitzgerald (2006:273) notes that 
Mexican authorities contended that “excessive emigration, particularly when 
aspirants abandoned existing jobs, was detrimental to the economy of major sending 
states.” Even though the bracero years caused a diversification of migrants’ points of 
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origin, Fernández-Ruiz (2003:42) claims that they still primarily hailed from the bajío 
region of Mexico. Michoacán, Jalisco, and Guanajuato remained the three primary 
“sending states” throughout the 22 years of the Bracero Program (Fitzgerald 
2006:273).  Yet communities that had not historically been a part of the migration 
circuit began to send more and more braceros.  They started building social networks 
of migrants and set in motion their own migration traditions.  This local fostering of 
migration was seen as a threat at higher levels of government, and, looking to protect 
productive activities, governors of Jalisco, Guanajuato, and Michoacán outlawed the 
contracting of braceros between 1943 and 1944 (Fitzgerald 2006:275).  Essentially, 
the Mexican government’s emigration stance was fickle during the bracero period, 
implementing strategies meant to slow or increase emigration at a moment’s notice, 
like a head gate regulates water flow. 
Era of Undocumented Immigration, 1960s-1980s 
 The end of the Bracero Program in 1964 did not signal an end of the demand 
for cheap labor in the United States.  In fact, even though nearly 5 million Mexican 
braceros entered the United States between 1942 and 1964, the number of 
apprehensions of undocumented migrants nearly always outnumbered the number of 
contract laborers (see Massey, et al. 2002:38).  American agriculture had become 
dependent on cheap Mexican labor.   
 At the same time, Mexicans had reason to look north for opportunities.  
Stability, the underpinnings of the economic projects that had caused the nation to 
eternally revere Cárdenas, began to erode in the mid-1960s.  The massacre, 
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wounding, and imprisoning of hundreds of students and workers at Tlalteloco in 1968 
and at least 50 at the Corpus Christi massacre in 1971 marked the end of the 
economic miracle based on Mexico’s solidarity (Raat 2004:149).  The demonstrators 
had rallied to disclose the lack of freedom in Mexico and to demand a more 
democratic government, and, in the end, they were attacked by their own 
government’s forces. The outcome of these events was a “greatly altered public 
perception of the country’s leadership” and it was “increasingly apparent that much of 
the PRI’s legitimacy had been eroded” (Meyer, Sherman and Deeds 2003:643-644).  
Ideas of democratization and decentralization began to surface when it became 
evident that the stability that the PRI-dominated government had heralded was a 
farce. 
 During this “era of undocumented” migration, migrants found themselves 
disdained at home and abroad.  The governments of Echeverría, López Portillo, and 
de la Madrid spurned working-class migrants and Chicanos, referring to them as 
“pochos” or “gringo-ized” Mexicans (Fitzgerald 2000:22).  The political elite 
considered Mexicans who left to “have exited the imagined national community” 
(Goldring 2002:65).   
 Although migrants were disdained in the 1970s and 1980s, Mexico had no 
policy toward its migrants.  In the 1980s, there were limited consular protections, 
which focused mainly on repatriation and cultural nationalism (ibid.).  Beginning in 
the 1980s Mexican officials began to realize that perhaps this policy of no policy was 
detrimental to Mexico.  Rosenblum found that Mexican policy makers believe that 
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Department of Foreign Ministries’ disinterest in migrant affairs prevented the 
government from at least attempting to influence the United States’ unilateral 1986 
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) (Fitzgerald 2006:280). 
Neoliberal Revolution, 1980s-2000 
 On the eve of its neoliberal revolution, Mexico was living out the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party’s (PRI) “peace for prosperity” pact.  The pact meant that the PRI 
would ensure Mexico’s security in return for all-out loyalty.  This meant the PRI 
controlled labor in return for wage increases.  As long as PRI remained in power, it 
allowed opposition parties.  Subsidies were given in turn for allegiance.  The 
government’s nationalistic position toward the outside world defined Mexico’s 
attitude toward the United States, transnational corporations, and financial institutions 
like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Smith 2003b:308).  Still, there were no 
shortage of circumstances that contributed to the “uncertainty and marginalization 
experienced by many households” in Mexico (Goldring 1999:165).  This 
marginalization, including that due to changes in the structure of agricultural 
production and economic and political restructuring, has been grounds for continued 
northward migration.  However, the impetus for this wave of migration were the 
drastic changes in Mexico’s political and economic life that would force individual 
states, including Michoacán, to squeeze into transnational spaces with new 
legislation, activities, and policies toward their migrants. 
 As early as 1976 Mexico was in the midst of political and fiscal crises (Raat 
2004:159).  By the mid 1970s, President Echeverría’s (1970-1976) economic 
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strategies had left a “bankrupt steel works, increased unemployment, a balance-of-
trade deficit, and a decline in the output of basic foodstuffs” (ibid.:160). In the late 
1970s Mexico began the depreciation process, first devaluing the peso by 60 percent, 
which continued throughout the 1980s. The discovery of new oil fields in 1976-- 
billion of barrels worth – allowed Mexico to access international loans with the IMF’s 
restrictions (ibid.:160).  Unfortunately, the price of oil dropped drastically in 1981, 
and Mexico realized it could not make its August debt servicing1982 payment on the 
$83 billion debt to the United States.  The following years were filled with loan 
restructuring, currency devaluation, bailouts, and their subsequent stipulations. The 
price of the bailouts were high: “Mexico agreed to an IMF-instituted austerity 
program that meant wage controls and a cut in government expenditures; price 
increases for goods and services provided by government agencies…[and] a move 
toward opening the market to international competition” (Raat 2004:162-3).    
 The sexenio of Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) witnessed more 
privatization at the expense of state power than any other presidency.  “Salinas-style 
modernization meant stressing the themes of electoral reform, debt reduction, 
improved productivity, privatization of property9, a larger role for U.S. capital” 
(ibid.).  Despite privatizing national banks, TV networks, the telephone company, and 
highway construction, the 1991 internal debt was still more than $101 billion 
(ibid.:199).  Understandably, the new economic issues exacerbated the illegal 
immigration (ibid.:204).  The debt problem arose again in the mid 1990s and 
Zedillo’s 1995 austerity plan further endorsed neoliberal practices.   
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Neoliberalism and Structural Adjustment 
 Neoliberalism is a politico-economic philosophy, prevalent since the 1980s, 
that deemphasizes governmental intervention in the economy and favors free markets 
and the primacy of the individual to achieve progress.  Popular with President Ronald 
Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, neoliberalism promoted 
reforms to which “there was no alternative” (Gledhill 2004:332).  One Mexican 
foreign minister explained neoliberalism in respect to relations with the United States:  
“The North agrees to commit more funds to the development of the South on 
condition that we put our houses in order” (ibid.2004:333).  Putting the Mexican 
house in order meant a “stripping away of government infrastructures under the 
combined effects of recession and structural adjustment” (Szanton Blanc et al. 
1995:684).  However, the changes experienced by the Mexican people were not only 
imposed upon by international actors (i.e., IMF and the United States).  Mexican 
political elites significantly changed their perspective about the role of government 
(Gledhill 2004:336).  
 Under Carlos Salinas de Gortari, Mexico adopted neoliberalism.  His goal was 
to transform Mexico’s state-centered economy to a free-market system (McDonald 
1999:274).  Gledhill (2004:337) says that  
capitalizing on the advantages of globalization for the elite of a country with 
massive reserves of cheap labor and ready access to U.S. markets therefore 
made sense to a wide range of elite actors, beyond the simple fact that relief 
from the debt crisis provoked by earlier policies could only be obtained by 
accepting the new rules of the international game. 
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 The signature of NAFTA, the epitome of neoliberal policies in Mexico, 
marked Mexico’s entrance into the free-market (Canales 2000:409). In 1994, the 
United States, Canada, and Mexico agreed on lowered tariffs and less regulation (e.g., 
easier passage of transport vehicles).  NAFTA has been beneficial to Mexico in some 
respects, for example, Mexican foreign trade has increased tremendously and the 
GNP has grown.    
 Interestingly, however, NAFTA developments have promoted trade that is 
“freer” for U.S. corporations than for Mexican labor.  In essence, the market has 
become less free for Mexico at all levels except for the most wealthy.  Growth due to 
NAFTA has been in the maquiladoras, the majority of which are foreign (not 
Mexican) owned.  Frequently, Mexican companies are smaller businesses that are 
going under because they cannot keep up with the large international companies with 
seemingly inexhaustible capital.  Small Mexican farmers, likewise, are no match for 
American agroindustry with its chemicals, technology, tractors, and tens of thousands 
of acres of cultivated land, because the bigger you are, the better you are able to 
compete.  Additionally, U.S. farmers are given government subsidies to operate, 
something that the Mexican government is unable to do.  This system can, therefore, 
not be considered “free trade” if the players are not dealt the same number of cards or 
cheating is going on at the table.  
 McDonald (1999) offers an interesting examination of the position of the state 
in the neoliberal revolution.  Neoliberal strategies in Mexico simply leave state 
governments in a difficult position.  “Free” trade, the privatization of government-run 
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organizations, and the transfer of programs from the federal government to state or 
municipal levels–without adequate increases in revenue sharing–all present increased 
stressors to the state government.  McDonald (1999:277) claims that the state, in this 
case Michoacán, cannot compete in the global market without money for productive 
infrastructure improvements.  He goes on to point out that  
as neoliberal ideas and policy sift downward to the local level, it becomes 
important to lay bare the knowledge, power, and practices that tie together the 
state as embodied in state functionaries in Mexico City, in Michoacán’s state 
capital of Morelia, and in even more proximate local outposts–with farmers 
and dairy processors at the local level (ibid.:280).   
 
 McDonald points out the strife and struggles that plague not only small 
farmers and laborers but also the state.  Yet, the state is put in a double bind because 
it has a more intimate understanding of its citizens but, like the central government, 
sees no other alternatives.  Klesner (2006:403) reveals that the real issue for the state 
is there are “limits to the income that can be generated from property taxes and fees 
imposed on already poor people.  Consequently, the state and local share of total 
government revenue raised remains quite low–on the order of 5 percent.”  Extracting 
money from the destitute is difficult, and the added responsibilities given to the state 
level of government through decentralization adds to a state’s desperation, leading it 
to look for lifesavers wherever they may be. 
Decentralization 
 One of the main issues of the “neoliberal revolution” was decentralization.  
Mexican power had long been concentrated at the center, figuratively and literally.  
Decentralization has taken place not only through formal and informal means.  
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“Creeping federalism” (ibid.:385) is the growth of the opposition parties’ (e.g., PAN) 
strength at the subnational level.  Formally, the presidencies of de la Madrid (1982-
1988) and Salinas (1988-1994) decentralized Mexico’s government through various 
programs, using rhetoric such as “descentralizar es democratizar y democratizar es 
descentralizar” (decentralization is democratization and democratization is 
decentralization)10 (de la Madrid in Rodríguez 1993:134).  This movement to 
geographically disperse power and to spread authority more evenly over all levels of 
government really was a way of being true to Mexico’s constitution, which had long 
incorporated a de jure federalism (Klesner 2006:385). Education and health are 
examples of sectors that were relegated to the state levels.   
 De la Madrid instituted municipal reform in 1984.  He intended to give more 
power to the municipal level, which had almost completely depended upon the state 
and federal levels economically (Rodríguez 1993).  He also reformed Article 115 of 
the Constitution, regarding the functions of the states and municipal governments.  
With his intended reforms, state and municipal governments would have more 
autonomy and control of their own development, which would open the space for new 
subnational actors and actions, including migrant organizations.  However, nothing 
came of the reforms–except an aggravation of the problem–as politics of the day 
stalled any action.   
  Salinas termed his decentralization campaign “Nuevo Federalismo” (New 
Federalism), which was a plan for the formal deconcentration of central power in 
Mexico. Nuevo Federalismo is based on Salinas’s Ph.D. dissertation at Harvard.  He 
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believed that “communities that participated in their own development tended to form 
highly critical attitudes toward the government;” (quoted in Fitzgerald 2000:23); 
therefore, he proposed a decentralization program that involved local leaders who 
would be less corrupt and more responsive.  This program, built into the World 
Bank’s antipoverty loans of the mid-1990s, was supposed to allocate “administrative 
and fiscal responsibility to lower levels of government” (Goldring 2002:83).  Nuevo 
Federalismo increased the financial autonomy of municipios, giving them control of 
revenues from property taxes and fees for public services. This was an important 
move because in 1983, 64 percent of local government revenues came from federal 
revenue sharing (Klesner 2006:402). 
 Nuevo Federalismo was not merely an altruistic act of the head of state.  
Rodriguez (1993:142) believes the  
contemporary efforts to decentralize…represent a political response to a crisis 
of legitimacy.  In other words, the purpose of decentralization has been to 
appear to redistribute political power while sustaining political control–to 
decentralize in order to centralize.  
 
Salinas even wrote in his dissertation that with Nuevo Federalismo “the rural sector 
could be developed economically while simultaneously generating support for the 
federal government” (quoted in Fitzgerald 2000:23).  Decentralization opened the 
doors for migrant claims to membership in the nation and migrant mobilization 
(Smith 2003b:329, 311).  States, facing increased responsibilities with minimal funds, 
did not turn a blind eye to migrant mobilization. 
 Using funds from the sale of previously state-owned companies, Salinas 
started the Programa Nacional de Solidaridad (National Solidarity Program, known as 
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PRONASOL) to “soften the effects of the neo-liberal adjustment policies” (Smith 
2003b:308).  The objectives of Solidaridad were to improve the living conditions of 
marginalized peoples, promote fair and balanced regional development, and fortify 
“the participation of social organizations and local authorities” (Rodríguez 1993:139).  
PRONASOL allowed more local participation in choosing and carrying out public 
projects.  However, as Fitzgerald (2000:139) notes, “the design of the program, 
funding levels, and major decisions were controlled by the central government.” 
 PRONASOL was part of the decentralization of the federal government 
because it no longer took initiative for public works projects.  Any organized group 
approached the PRONASOL officials (advisory functionaries of the central 
government) and presented its idea for a public work project.  The government then 
provided most of the financial resources for the project if it gained the approval of 
officials after analysis.  The group contributed the labor and if possible local 
resources to finish the project (Rodríguez 1993:139).   
 As all of these changes in Mexico's various levels of government were going 
on, Mexico was also beginning to “intensify, broaden, and institutionalize the 
relationship with Mexicans in the United States” (Smith 2003b:306).  This was part of 
a larger process known as acercamiento (alignment)–Mexico coming closer with the 
United States.  PRONASOL adapted in light of acercamiento, developing Solidaridad 
Internacional.  This federal funding program, appropriately referred to as 2 x 1, 
matched every dollar raised by a U.S.-based hometown club with two dollars, one 
from the federal government and one from the appropriate state government.   
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Strengthening Ties with Mexicans Abroad 
 The neoliberal revolution and its economic and political consequences caused 
Mexico to look to its migrants abroad to bolster the nation, after a period during the 
1970s and early 1980s when Mexico was disinterested in its emigrants. Mexican 
migrants have had a long history of organizing, so municipalities, states, and the 
federal government worked to gather these organizations under their control to claim 
some of the benefits, which include remittances.  However, people without formal 
membership in the country are difficult to direct, so Mexico had to formally redefine 
its relationship with Mexicans residing abroad.  The PRI looked to formalize migrant 
organizations to circumvent the opposition that was gaining favor in certain areas of 
the country.  Additionally, Mexico hoped that its citizens abroad would lobby for 
Mexico in United States politics.  Finally, gaining a closer relationship with Mexican 
expatriates abroad would help the government to protect their civil rights. 
 Until the mid-1980s, transnational activities were largely located outside the 
“sphere of influence of the Mexican state” (Goldring 2002:64).  More or less formal 
versions of hometown clubs have been a channel for  “collective and focused 
expression” to migrants’ claims of “substantive membership” in their place and 
country of origin.  The Mexican and certain state-level governments, especially 
Zacatecas early on, began to realize these organizations’ potential to serve the 
interests of the nation or state.   
 Zacatecas is considered the “vanguard of creating provincial-level policies 
aimed at organizing emigrants in the United States by provincial origin and 
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incorporating them into the political and economic life of the sending region” 
(Fitzgerald 2006:281).  Smith (2003b:313) cites the Zacatecan Federation (the 
umbrella organization of Zacatecan hometown associations) as a model on which 
Mexico based other federations.  In fact, some members of the Zacatecan Federation 
claim ownership of the matching funds idea (Goldring 2002:78) that was later 
institutionalized as Solidaridad Internacional in Salinas’s term and continues today as 
Programa 3x1 para Migrantes.   
 Since the late 1980s, the Mexican federal government has become more 
interested in emigrants and has reached out to them.  Goldring (2002:65) claims that 
it became particularly interested in emigrants in the 1980s because of several 
convergent reasons:  Cárdenas’s campaign in the United States challenged PRI’s 
hegemony in Mexico11 and nearly 3 million Mexicans were legalized in the United 
States under IRCA in 1986, creating a “large cohort of persons who considered 
themselves Mexicans but had a secure legal position in the United States.”  Moreover, 
preserving ties with emigrants was a way to maintain remittances and promote 
investment in the country. 
 The state and local governments, not the federal government, truly began the 
process of politicizing migrants’ transnational lives.  These activities “attracted little 
attention from an unengaged, even neglectful Mexican state” (Smith 2003a:728-729).  
But in the early 1990s,  the federal government began to pay more attention to 
emigrants in the United States, in effect institutionalizing hometown and homestate 
organizations (ibid.:56).  Migrants were suddenly seen as politically important 
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because Mexico was losing both economic and political stability--it was grasping 
anything to avoid further collapse.   
How has Mexico Institutionalized Transnationalism? 
 Mexico’s institutionalization of transnationalism is both  1) abstract or 
universalistic and 2) substantive.  Abstract or universalistic transnationalism includes 
changes in how the government perceives migrants, the use of “global nation” 
rhetoric, and assurance of nationality and later citizenship.  Substantive policies 
include bureaucratic reforms, development programs, government agencies created 
especially to serve migrants, the vote abroad, campaigning in the United States, and 
educational and health programs aimed at migrants.   
 The intangible or abstract changes that occurred as Mexico drew closer to 
emigrants are mainly the work of the federal government, as they involve questions of 
nationality, citizenship, and the government’s overall perception of migrants abroad.  
While subnational levels of government may have their own perceptions of the status 
of migrants, states and municipalities do not have the power to say if migrants living 
abroad are still Mexicans.   
 Blatantly opposing previous presidents’ perceptions of migrants as traitors or 
pochos, Vicente Fox exalted migrants as Mexico’s heroes when he took office in 
2000 (Fitzgerald 2006:279).  Even earlier than that, the Mexican Development Plan 
of 1995-2000 (Smith 2003b:309) included the following goals: 
to strengthen cultural links with Mexicans abroad and with people with 
Mexican roots outside Mexico,...to recognize that the Mexican nation extends 
beyond its physical border. 
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Other government officials recognized their position in the new current of drawing 
migrants in, including Roger Díaz de Cossio, first director of the Programa para las 
Comunidades Mexicanas en el Extranjero (PCME), who claimed, “this is my job: to 
create the Mexican global nation” (ibid.).  Clearly, the national state progressively 
began to incorporate Mexicans abroad into the national rhetoric, and its perception of 
migrants changed from one of derision to one of acclaim.  But words alone cannot 
bring dispersed nationals under the nation’s wing.   
 President Zedillo’s (1994-2000)  strategy was to redefine the Mexican nation 
to include Mexicans living outside the national territory.  Under his new definition, 
which was approved in 1996 and put in effect in 1998 (Goldring 2002:67), Mexicans 
living and working in the United States could become naturalized United States 
citizens without losing their Mexican nationality.  This redefinition of “Mexican-
ness” highlights the lengths the nation-state was willing to go.  Goldring (ibid.) 
claims that under Zedillo, Mexico’s strategy toward its migrants abroad “shifted to 
become more universalistic, explicitly extraterritorial, and perhaps more rhetorical.”  
Mexican emigrants who naturalize as U.S. citizens and even their U.S.-born children 
could keep their Mexican passports, retain their constitutional rights as Mexicans, and 
own property that only Mexicans are allowed to own.  However, they could not vote 
or serve in the Mexican military (Sherman 1999:855).  The understanding of 
nationhood under Zedillo was more diasporic than in the past (Levitt and Dehesa 
2003:592).  The no-loss of nationality measure was more rhetorical than substantive, 
more of an enticement than a concession–a message that we will still consider you 
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Mexican nationals if you remain economically connected to the nation even though 
you have settled in the United States.   
 Substantive policies adopted by the Mexican national state since the 1980s 
have increased in scope and intensity.  Bureaucratic reforms include the creation of 
several programs under the secretaría de relaciones exteriores (SRE, secretariat of 
external relations), state offices for services to migrants abroad, changes in 
politicking and elections, and other services offered to migrants.  While the symbolic 
politics of the universalistic and abstract changes the Mexican government made 
regarding its migrants were “measures aimed at reinforcing emigrants’ sense of long-
term membership” (Levitt and Dehesa 2003:597), low-cost policies, such as 
promoting cultural festivals, contests, and sports, have also been implemented to 
promote national culture abroad.  Interestingly, substantive politics seem to resonate 
more at the state level of government than at the federal level.    
 The Mexican national state has looked to existing transmigrant organizations 
to reaffirm its relationship with Mexicans abroad.  With these organizations as its 
target, bureaucratic reforms created various federal offices and agencies, all with the 
hope of returning migrants’ focus to Mexico on the government’s terms.  The formal 
goal of these bureaucratic reforms was to foster “links and mutual understanding 
between Mexicans on both sides of the border” (ibid.:590).   
 Salinas developed the Programa Paisano (Countryman Program), the 
Programa para las Comunidades Mexicanas en el Extranjero (Program for Mexican 
Communities Abroad, PCME), and Solidaridad Internacional (Solidarity 
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International) during his presidency.  The Programa Paisano’s goal is to improve the 
treatment of returning migrants.  Aimed at the thousands of circular, return, or back-
and-forth migrants who send money to family, friends, and home communities, the 
PCME is one of the most “elaborate and successful” matching funds or “like 
investment” programs instituted by any country of origin (ibid.:592).  The name given 
to this formalized arrangement between transmigrant organizations and the three 
levels of Mexican government, “Programa para las Comunidades Mexicanas en el 
Extranjero,” is interesting on its own accord, as it accentuates migrants’ national 
identity while distinguishing it with geographical residence (Fitzgerald 2000:23).  
The PCME’s goals were to “maintain cultural links between Mexico, its emigrants 
and their children; to foster investment in the home communities in Mexico; and to 
protect the rights and promote the development of the Mexicans in the United States” 
(Smith 2003:306).   
 Solidaridad Internacional was also a prominent transnational program created 
under Salinas de Gortari’s presidency in 1992.  This federal funding program, 
appropriately referred to as 2 x 1, matched every dollar raised by a U.S.-based 
hometown club with two dollars, one from the federal government and one from the 
appropriate state government.  A point worthy of note is the devolution of this 
program and the subsequent change of policy and name to “3 x 1” following the crisis 
of 1995, when bail-out loan stipulations and Nuevo Federalismo prompted Mexico to 
institutionalize its transnational programs at the subnational level (i.e., state and 
municipal).  Goldring (2002:68) reminds us that we must keep the whole picture of 
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what was happening in Mexico in mind:  Solidaridad Internacional “should be 
understood as part of a broader agenda of neoliberal restructuring generally couched 
in rhetoric and policies aimed at reducing the national state sector and expanding the 
scope of market forces.”   
 Whereas scholars have seen dichotomies of resistance (in this case migrants or 
migrant organizations) and hegemony (the nation-state co-opting migrants’ political 
autonomy) in the creation of such programs, this view is too simplistic and discounts 
the multitude of actors between the nation-state and the individual migrant.  Goldring 
(1999:167) claims that the PCME’s aims to “build or reinforce national identity 
among migrants whose home-town, regional or provincial identities may have been 
stronger when they began to migrate.”  However, migrant-initiated projects that go 
through PCME go through the state level of government for approval.  This is more 
than mere bureaucracy for bureaucracy’s sake.  Mexico would not be able to build its 
global nation through shared investment projects with migrants without the 
buttressing of the subnational levels of government.  Constructing a potable water or 
sewer system, paving a road, building baseball or soccer fields “required equipment, 
materials, negotiations, and especially local knowledge, none of which were at the 
dispersal of the PCME staff in Mexico City” (Goldring 2002:67).   
 In addition to legislation and the creation of offices and programs directed at 
promoting and harnessing remittance flows, Mexican politicians and hopefuls visit 
migrant communities in the United States. To maintain relations and encourage HTAs 
to participate in matching fund projects, municipal presidents and governors travel 
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abroad to towns and cities where many of their constituents live.  Calling migrants 
“agents of change” and highlighting their contributions to the state’s economic and 
social life, Zacatecan gubernatorial candidate Ricardo Monreal campaigned in 
California in 1998, even though migrants could not vote from abroad (Goldring 
1998:167).  Notably, Vicente Fox campaigned in Chicago and California in May of 
2000.  He supported the right to vote for Mexicans living abroad and “he publicly 
declared that migrants who sustain their hometown’s economies should exercise their 
influence with family members in Mexico” (Fitzgerald 2000:27). Monreal went even 
further, proposing that “Zacatecanos directly elect congresspersons in the state 
assembly to represent those in the United States, via a representational scheme” 
(Smith 2003b:317).   
 Extending suffrage to Mexicans abroad is probably one of the most significant 
moves of the Mexican government to strengthen ties with migrants.  Furthermore, it 
points to the importance of state-level government actions.  Smith (2003b:311) 
believes that even talk of the right to vote abroad suggests “evidence of the significant 
decentralization of power away from an omnipotent president” and toward a system 
where lower levels of the federal and state governments matter.   
 Allowing migrants to vote deepens migrants’ membership in the nation.  The 
extension of dual nationality to migrants allowed a certain level of membership in the 
nation, but migrants were not allowed political citizenship.  Goldring (1998:3) wrote 
before the extension of the right to vote: 
They can participate economically, lobby for Mexico from the United States, 
and maintain a vibrant Mexican culture, but they cannot participate directly in 
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political processes in Mexico.  They can be cultural and dues-paying or 
market members of the nation, but not full–albeit transnational–citizens. 
 
The activities of programs such as 3x1 para Migrantes, Solidaridad Internacional, and 
programs under PCME offer a symbolic form of membership, but it is limited 
because it does not involve full political rights and “does little to alter the benefits or 
duties with membership in the nation” (Goldring 2002:69).   
 In 1996, the Mexican Congress removed restrictions on voting of 
nonresidents.  The Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) offered logistical scenarios 
concerning the extraterritorial vote 1998.  However, due to PRI resistance, migrants 
were not allowed to vote in the 2000 elections.  Practical issues further complicate the 
vote from abroad, as many migrants who are Mexican citizens do not have the 
necessary IFE credencial (voter registration card).  Despite the hesitation of PRI 
politicians, complications, and the fact that of the million applications disseminated 
only a small percentage actually voted, the legislation itself made  
U.S. migrants instantly more powerful because they could now demand the 
vote not as a “migrant right” (without legal foundation) but as their 
‘Constitutional rights as Mexicans,’ also legitimizing wider participation in 
politics (Smith 2003a:732). 
 
At the crux of the political, economic, and migratory histories of Mexico, we find 
validity in studying the subnational institutionalization of transnationalism.  Since 
Spanish independence, regional areas have claimed autonomy from the national 
government.  The politics and economics of neoliberalism placed stressors on state 
governments, giving them more responsibilities but nevertheless strapping them to 
federal revenue-sharing budgets.  Finally, states are compelled to search out ways to 
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keep afloat.  States with high indices of migration search out transnational processes, 
co-opting migrants’ organizations, and activities and managing federal measures. 
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CHAPTER 5 
MICHOACÁN: 
THE STATE OF THE TRANSNATIONAL STATE 
 
Ya me habían dicho, 
Me habían contado 
Unos que vienen  
Y otros que van, 
Que allá en mi tierra 
Hay cosas bellas 
Y que una de ellas  
Se llama Michoacán. 
Now they have told me 
They have recounted to me 
Some who come 
And others who go, 
That there in my land 
There are beautiful things 
And that one of those 
Is called Michoacán.  
Rudy Flores, “A Michoacán," 1977
 
Michoacán: cuna de migración transnacional  
Michoacán: cradle of transnational migration. 
Victor Espinosa, 1998 
 
 In “The Study of Transnationalism: Pitfalls and Promise of an Emergent 
Research Field,” Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt (1999) warn potentially overzealous 
scholars of the snags and dangers inherent in a relatively new perspective on 
transnationalism.  In attempting to promote this concept as a “clearly defined and 
measurable object of research” (ibid.:218), Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt not only 
describe the failures and negative tendencies of existing transnationalism studies, they 
also offer a set of guidelines for responsibly implementing an innovative perspective.   
In examining Michoacán as a transnational state, I will use Portes, Guarnizo, and 
Landolt’s guidelines to offer an analysis that does not “frustrate the viability of an 
otherwise promising topic of research.”   
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 Their guidelines are as follows: 1) establish the phenomenon; 2) delimit the 
phenomenon; 3) define the unit of analysis; 4) distinguish types; and 5) identify 
necessary conditions. 
 
Establish the Phenomenon 
  “It is of no use attempting to explain a phenomenon whose existence has not 
been proved” (ibid.:218). In arguing that we must look at the subnational level of 
Mexican transnational politics, we must prove that 1) the process involves a 
significant number of actors; 2) the activities are not “fleeting or exceptional, but 
possess certain stability and resilience over time;” and 3) “the content of these 
activities is not captured by some pre-existing concept, making the invention of a new 
term redundant” (ibid.:219). 
Michoacán’s Numbers 
 Between 1990 and 2000, more than 370,000 michoacanos (9.4% of the 
population) left for the United States.  Between 10 and 11.5 percent of Mexican 
migrants during this decade were michoacanos (Bada 2004:83; López Castro 
2003:14).  Of the 893,671 households in Michoacán at the 2000 census (CONAPO 
2000b), 15.5 percent either had emigrants who lived in the United States, were 
circular migrants, or had a migrant return home during 1995-2000.  Over 11 percent 
of michoacano households receive remittances.  Almost a quarter  of the state’s 
municipios (similar to a county in the United States) have a “very high” level of 
migration intensity,12 and over half are defined as above “high” (ibid.).  Only 7 
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percent of Michoacán’s municipios have a “low” or “very low” level of migration 
(CONAPO 2000a:7).   
 From data gathered from the United States census and CONAPO, the 
Proyecto de Investigación sobre la Situación de los Michoacanos en los Estados 
Unidos (Investigation Project of the Situation of Michoacanos in the United States) 
calculates that between 2 and 2.5 million michoacanos–half or more of the population 
living in the state--live and work in the United States (Modelo de Atención al 
Migrante Michoano 2004:5).  According to the General Coordination for the 
Attention to Michoacán Migrants (Coordinación General para la Atención al 
Migrante Michoacano 2006b), the majority of michoacanos migrate to California 
(73%), Illinois (7.2%), and the state of Washington (6.9%).   
 Michoacán’s long history of migration to the United States has led 
michoacanos to organize in certain areas of the United States, most notably in Alaska, 
California, Illinois, Nevada, Texas, and Washington (where the HTAs have registered 
with the state government) (Instituto Michoacanos de los Migrantes en el Extranjero 
2007).  Michoacano migrant HTAs numbered 19 in 1998; by 2003 they had grown to 
51 (Bada, Fox and Selee 2006:14).   
 One of the preeminent examples of a michoacano HTA is the Federación de 
Clubes Michoacanos de Illinois (Federation of Michoacan Clubs of Illinois, 
FEDECMI).  The FEDECMI estimates that there are around 500,000 michoacanos in 
the Midwest.  The Mexican Consulate General in Chicago estimates that 165,000 
michoacanos live in Chicago alone.    
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Michoacan’s Contemporary Programs and Policies 
 Aligning itself with other Mexican states with high emigration rates, such as 
Zacatecas, Jalisco, and Guanajuato, Michoacán created the Dirección de Apoyo Legal 
y Administrativa a Trabajodores Emigrantes (Direction of Administration and Legal 
Support for Emigrant Workers), on June 22, 1992 (Estado de Michoacán 2006).  The 
creation of the Coordinación Estatal para la Atención al Migrante Michoacano (State 
Coordination for the Attention to Michoacano Migrantes) subsumed the former entity 
on April, 23, 2001.   
 This new body, an autonomous entity under the secretary of the government, 
was to support michoacano migrants with immigration proceedings, legal assistance, 
and in emergencies.  The Coordinación General para la Atención al Migrante 
Michoacano (General Coordination for the Attention to Michoacán Migrants) was 
created on April 19, 2002.  It was authorized to propose, coordinate, evaluate, 
promote, and execute programs and actions for michoacano migrants.  The 
coordination had 24 mandates, including human rights and safety, migrant investment 
in the state, cultural maintenance, and fostering ties to the state.  In September 2003, 
Governor Cárdenas Batel officially demarcated the coordination’s position within the 
state government, equipped it with a legal framework, defined its rules of procedure, 
and further delineated powers and mandates (Hernández Tovar 2003).  In May 2004, 
Michoacán’s state development plan (Plan Estatal de Desarrollo) included as one of 
its intentions the coordination’s proposition to create a bureau in the United States to 
further promote state government ties with its migrants.  
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The Transnational State 
 Anthropologists, sociologists, and other social scientists have discussed the 
idea of the transnational nation-state, but arguments for looking at the subnational 
level of government has only been glossed over in the literature.  There is a wealth of 
literature about Mexico’s institutionalized transnationalism and emigrant 
incorporation, yet individual states’ roles have been seen as supplemental evidence to 
the greater argument.  Several social scientists (particularly Fitzgerald 2000, 2004, 
2006 and Goldring 1998, 1999, 2002) have called for attention to the state level, but 
research on state-level emigration politics and transnational processes remains sparce.  
 
Delimit the Phenomenon and Define the Unit of Analysis 
 Having established that the transnational state is viable for study, we should 
now delimit the phenomenon.  Not all state-level government actions are 
transnational.  Nor do all state-level governments act transnationally.  “Delimiting the 
scope of predication of a term is … necessary to avoid its spurious extension to every 
aspect of reality, a common experience when a particular concept becomes popular” 
(Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt 1999).  Therefore, the transnational state’s actions are 
those that require legislation and support primarily from the state government or those 
federal policies that are relegated to the state level (e.g., PCME, with primary 
decision makers and knowledge located at the state).   
 One would hope that most legislation, policies, and government programs are 
not capricious or casual, but we must be wary of state policies or declarations that are 
merely lip service, with no intention of follow through and application.  Portes, 
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Guarnizo, and Landolt (1999:219) say “[w]hat constitutes truly original phenomena 
and, hence, a justifiable new topic of investigation, are the high intensity of 
exchanges, the new modes of transacting, and the multiplication of activities that 
require cross-border travel and contacts on a sustained basis.” 
 There are plenty of state-directed exchanges, transactions, and activities to 
justify considering the Michoacán as a transnational state.  Notwithstanding the 
likelihood of incomplete migrant-focused policies and projects, the number of 
completed state-sponsored transnational activities in Michoacán has grown.13  
Between 2002 and 2005, a total of 402 3x1 para Migrantes projects were completed, a 
97 percent increase between 2003 and 2004 and 74 percent between 2004 and 2005.  
In addition to the economic, cultural, and other political programs used by other 
Mexican states, such as Zacatecas and Jalisco, Michoacán’s vanguard position in 
allowing its migrants abroad to vote in state and municipal elections, beginning 2007, 
is evidence of new modes of transacting and the increased need for cross-border 
travel and sustained contacts. 
 
Distinguish Types 
 Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt (1999.:221) recommend a working typology of 
transnationalism that distinguishes between economic, political, and sociocultural 
activities.  They claim that this typology “has proved useful in organizing what 
otherwise would be a chaotic set of activities.” The table below shows their typology 
of transnationalism and levels of institutionalization, including examples of each type 
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and level.  The examples of a high level of institutionalization are particularly 
important to the study of the transnational state.   
TABLE 1: TRANSNATIONALISM AND ITS TYPES 
Sector 
 Economic Political Sociocultural 
Low • Informal cross-
country traders 
• Small businesses 
created by returned 
immigrants in 
home country 
• Long-distance 
circular labor 
migration 
 
• Hometown civic 
committees 
created by 
immigrants 
• Alliances of 
immigrant 
committee with 
home country 
political 
associations 
• Fund raisers for 
home country 
electoral 
candidates 
• Amateur cross-
country sport 
matches 
• Folk music 
groups making 
presentations in 
immigrant centers 
• Priests from home 
visit and organize 
their parishioners 
abroad 
 
L
ev
el
 o
f 
in
st
it
ut
io
na
li
za
ti
on
 
High • Multinational 
investments in 
Third World 
countries 
• Development for 
tourist market of 
locations abroad 
• Agencies of home 
country banks in 
immigrant centers 
• Consular officials 
and 
representatives of 
national political 
parties abroad 
• Dual nationality 
granted by home 
country 
governments 
• Immigrant 
selected to home 
country 
legislatures 
• International 
expositions of 
national arts 
• Home country 
major artists 
perform abroad 
• Regular cultural 
events organized 
by foreign 
embassies 
(adapted from Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt 1999:222) 
 
 A transnational state takes into account its migrants through high intensity of 
legislation and implementation of policies and programs directed at the economic, 
political, and social aspects of the lives of its emigrants.  Through state-level policies 
that span national borders, states may be transnational states if--in the absence of 
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federal policies, or through allocation of responsibilities from the federal to the state 
level--the state passes legislation and secures participation from migrants. 
 The high institutionalization of transnational activities dealing with politics is 
important not only on a symbolic sense but also on a very substantive level.  
Politicians campaigning abroad and referencing migrants as important to the state 
bring migrants into the fold of state rhetoric, yet other practices endeavor to ensure 
migrant support and continued ties to the state.  Practices, activities, and policies of 
more practical value include establishing individual state migrant aid offices where 
there is a critical mass of migrants abroad, granting suffrage to migrants abroad (for 
state level and other subnational elections), allocating seats in state legislature for 
migrants.   
 Economic activities are rightfully at the forefront of Mexican states’ policies 
toward migrants abroad.  With the program 3x1 para Migrantes, Mexico attempts to 
channel remittances through the state for productive projects.  While this is a federal 
program located in many states in Mexico, it is essentially operated at the state level 
and is dependent on state-level support, outreach, recruitment, and technical support 
(registering HTAs, accounting, and project authorization).  Burgess (2006:103) 
claims that even though the central office of Sedesol (the secretaría de desarrollo 
social, secretary of social development) oversees the 3x1 program, the majority of the 
specific responsibilities are carried out by state delegates.  “Each delegate receives 
applications for projects and presides over the Comité de Validación y Atención a 
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Migrantes (Validation and Attention to Migrants Committee), which determines 
which projects to approve at the state level” (ibid.).   
 While it may be easy to discount the importance of institutionalized 
sociocultural projects, state-sponsored cultural events and exchanges create a sense of 
unity between the “here” and “there” communities.  Art exhibitions, culture weeks, 
classes on indigenous groups’ traditions, language classes, beauty queen contests, and 
binational education strategies (such as distance learning) are examples of how the 
state is able to attempt to be continually present in migrants’ lives abroad.   
 
Identifying Necessary Conditions 
 It would be wrong to extend the term “transnational state” to just any state, or 
for that matter, any level of government, that merely happens to have a nominal 
interest in its citizens abroad.  In addition to the three types of transnationalism–
political, economic, and sociocultural–there are necessary preconditions that cause a 
state government to actively pursue its migrants through legislation, policy, and 
targeted activities.  The transnational state lies at the intersection of state-level 
legislation, migrant buy-in, and federal relegation of policies and programs to the 
state level.   
 Although structural adjustment programs implemented in the 1980s required 
Mexico to decentralize its government and to privatize many of its services, the 
outcome of such actions left state governments in a bind.  Salinas de Gortari’s 
Solidaridad program, part of his Nuevo Federalismo agenda, transferred symbolic 
power and development decision making to the municipal level, while leaving the 
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state government to perform an added number of duties with less money.  Klesner 
(2006:403) claims that  
[s]tates are especially squeezed in the federal fiscal equation, for they cannot 
effectively raise revenue from the sources reserved to local governments nor 
from the major federal tax sources–the income and value-added taxes.  So 
they rely on federal revenue sharing. 
 
 Specifically, Michoacán began institutionalizing transnational activities later 
than other states historically known as “sending states,” such as Zacatecas. Goldring 
(2002) observes that there are regional differences that lead to different outcomes in 
the Mexican national state’s efforts to incorporate transmigrants into the nation and in 
the actual workings of state-transmigrant relations at the state and municipal levels.  
Areas are different not only historically, but have different resource bases, levels of 
poverty, relationships with the national state, governing parties, and ethnic 
composition.  Michoacán, unlike Zacatecas, which is an Institutional Revolutionary 
Party (PRI) stronghold, has long been a Democratic Revolution Party (PRD) bastion.  
Goldring believes that the PRI has been interested in sustaining hegemony through 
programs aimed at broadening the transnational state.  “The strength of PRD support 
in Michoacán may have contributed to the relatively slow development of central or 
regional state efforts to work with transmigrant organization” (Goldring 2002:81). 
 The Mexican national government, while intent on reining in its entire nation–
including those living within the geopolitical borders of the country and those “más 
allá de las fronteras" (beyond the borders)--must allocate responsibility to the state 
level to fulfill its own mandates.  Another precondition that we cannot forget is that 
the state government must have been “absent” at some point and is now attempting to 
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catch up to other groups, such as migrants and even drug traffickers, who have gained 
power by doing the job of the government (see McDonald 2005).  Michoacano 
migrants have a long history of organizing and carrying out projects in their 
communities of origin, filling in various levels of governmental shortfalls.   
 The first michoacano said to have migrated to the Chicago area was Ramón 
Sánchez, of Jiquilpan, in 1893.  Only a little over three decades later, two men started 
the first michoacano organization in Illinois, Sociedad Cuauhtémoc (Bada 2003:260).  
Nearly three-quarters of a century later, in 1997, 14 clubs formed the FEDECMI, at 
the urging of the Mexican consulate in Chicago (ibid.:265, 271).  To date, 27 clubes 
de oriundos (hometown clubs) participate in the FEDECMI.  The vision of the 
FEDECMI is to 
promover el bienestar social y el progreso de los Michoacanos que radican 
tanto en México como en los Estados Unidos, a través de la promoción de 
actividades caritativas filantrópicas, culturales, científicas y educativas entre 
los michoacanos y no michoacanos en Illinois y en México (ibid.). 
 
(promote the social welfare and progress of michoacanos who are as much in 
Mexico as in the United States, through the promotion of cultural, scientific, 
and educational philanthropic and charitable activities, with michoacanos and 
non-michoacanos in Illinois and Mexico). 
 
Involvement in the FEDECMI has allowed michoacanos in the Chicago area to have 
closer relations with the state government, helping to “improve support to carry out 
projects in their communities of origin” (ibid.272).   
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Michoacán as a Transnational State  
Sociocultural Transnational Activities  
 Institutionalized sociocultural activities aimed at migrants abroad are 
important to the transnational state because identity and membership are tied up so 
tightly in sociocultural processes.  If michoacanos, or what is more likely the case, 
their non-Mexican born children, forget the particularities of what it means to be 
michoacanos, the state will have no rein over other aspects of their participation.  For 
this reason, Michoacán has implemented activities to promote Michoacanoness 
abroad.  The state conducts binational forums, Semanas Culturales (Cultural Weeks), 
workshops in communities of origin, and distance learning through institutes of 
higher learning in Michoacán.   
 Analysis of these programs is limited because the only available data are from 
the Michoacán government and that is limited in scope and depth of information. 
Michoacán does not seem as interested in conducting state-sponsored sociocultural 
activities, compared to political or economic activities.  However, it is evident from 
the state’s close ties with federations that Michoacán is working at informing its 
migrants abroad and at keeping them Michoacanos.  
Economic Transnational Activities 
 One of the primary goals of the nascent Coordinación General para la 
Atención al Migrante Michoacano (General Coordination for the Attention to 
Michoacano Migrants, COGAMIM) in 2002 was to fortify the local and regional 
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economy.  To this end, three programs were implemented:  Remesas Michoacanas 
(Michoacán Remittances), Orientación a Mujeres Familiares de Migrantes 
(Orientation for Women of Migrant Families), and Programa de Atención Ciudadana 
3x1 (Program for Citizen Attention 3x1, popularly called 3x1 para Migrantes).  The 
state has provided little data on the first two programs and further research would be 
needed to assess the efficacy and outcomes. 
 The signature economic program aimed at migrants in many Mexican states is 
the 3x1 para Migrantes matching program.  Michoacán, unlike Zacatecas, which 
claims to own the idea of the matching investment programs, began relatively late (in 
2002).  Projects completed through 3x1 para Migrantes include social infrastructure, 
such as lienzos charros (rodeo rings); ornamental projects, such park benches and 
gazebos; and productive projects, such as greenhouses.  
 The program, according to COGAMIM, formally began on July 6, 2002, and 
in that year completed 64 projects (48 social infrastructure, 4 ornamental, and 12 
productive projects).  The total budget (sum of migrant, state, federal, and municipal 
contributions) for 2002 was 39,222,320 pesos ($4 million, at the average 2002 
exchange rate of 9.8 pesos/$1).  In 2003, 64 projects were funded, for a total of 
30,465,327 pesos ($2.82 million).  The program’s third year (2004) witnessed a large 
growth in the number of projects and total budget: 126 projects were completed, with 
a sum total of 69,074,064 pesos ($6.12 million).  The last data available are for 2005, 
which testified to the growing number of projects and investment.  A total of 
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82,488,000 pesos ($7.57 million) funded 148 projects (Coordinación General para la 
Atención al Migrante Michoacano 2006a).  
 Even though Michoacán implemented the 3x1 program only in 2002, it is 
meeting its development goals with more success than in other states.  One of the 
explicit objectives is to alleviate poverty in marginalized areas. The majority of 
projects in Michoacán were conducted in areas of medium and high levels of 
marginalization.  
 
TABLE 2:  NUMBER OF PROJECTS PER MUNICIPIO  
CHARACTERIZED BY LEVEL OF MARGINALIZATION 
Year 
Very high 
Marginalization 
High 
Marginalization 
Medium 
Marginalization 
Low/Very Low 
Marginalization 
2002 2 29 43 25 
2003 3 38 48 11 
2004 6 33 46 14 
2005 3 42 42 13 
    (adapted from Burgess 2006:112) 
 
 However, this goal does not offset the fact that the state would like to have a 
greater percentage of productive projects compared to ornamental and social 
infrastructure projects.  Migrant groups tend to be more inclined to participate in 
social infrastructure ventures, such as building rodeo rings, paving roads, and 
financing patron saint festivals or ornamental projects such as restoring church 
frescos or building plaza gazebos, than in developing projects such as greenhouses or 
other productive projects that would assuage poverty and lessen the need to migrate.  
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Of the six HTAs interviewed by Bada (2003:278), only two were interested in 
planning the financing of productive projects.   
 Michoacán, while attaining migrant buy-in with the 3x1 program, has not 
channeled the nearly $2.2 billion in remittances it receives each year  through the 
conduits it sees as most important (Migration Policy Institute 2007:8).  Even 
supposing the goal of 3x1 para Migrantes is not the completion of projects but rather 
the greater sense of unity that is tendered through mutual ventures, michoacano 
migrants continue to have an upper hand and choose if and how they wish to fund 
projects.  The program is quite regulated, with the state choosing which projects to 
accept in the matching funds program; however, migrants, in the end, hold the 
preliminary purse strings.  Unfortunately, the primary losers in this migrant-state 
game are the citizens in the communities of origin.  
Political Transnational Activities  
 One of the defining moments in Mexican political transnationalism is 
Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas’ presidential campaign trip to the United States in 1988.  This 
michoacano’s visit to supporters of the opposition (Cárdenas ran on the Democratic 
Revolutionary Party, PRD, ticket) incited politicians at many levels of government to 
take note of the power of the migrant voice, even when they did not yet have the right 
to vote from abroad.  From the beginning of his term, Cárdenas’s son, Lázaro 
Cárdenas Batel, 2002-2008 governor of Michoacán, promoted greater political rights 
for michoacano migrants abroad. 
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 The rights to vote and political representation are particularly salient in 
discussions of transnational political practices.  While the Mexican government 
authorized migrant suffrage in 1996, Mexicans living abroad were not able to vote in 
presidential elections until 2006.  Michoacán has led the way in upholding migrants’ 
political rights.  In November 2007, a nominal number of michoacanos will vote in 
gubernatorial elections, without having to return home from the United States.  While 
the number is small, Michoacán’s move toward offering more political rights to 
migrants is important symbolically.  Michoacán now recognizes its migrants as full 
citizens of the state.  Even though less than 1,000 people will vote in the Michoacán 
gubernatorial election from abroad, the test of this effort will be the coming sexenios 
and voter turn-out trends in the future. 
 In 2005, the Michoacán state chamber of deputies appointed the first migrant 
to a plurinominal seat on the PRD ticket.  Jesús Martínez, an academic who lived 
most of his life in San Jose, California, quickly began working for greater migrant 
representation in the state government, saying, “We are trying to begin this 
representation of the michoacano congress and we want Michoacanos to 
organize…and have concrete proposals and reunions with our paisanos (countrymen) 
wherever they are” (Ollín 2005:2).  Although michoacano migrants do not have a 
permanent seat in the state legislature, the occupation of a plurinominal position was 
a large step not only for migrants but also for the state as a whole.  If the state is to 
continue to depend heavily on remittances, it would do well to create a permanent 
position for migrant representation in the legislature. 
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FIGURE 2: CASA MICHOACAN:  
CULMINATING ACTIVITY FOR THE TRANSNATIONAL STATE 
 
Casa Michoacán, Chicago, Illinois (photo by author) 
 
 Just southeast of downtown Chicago, near the once busy train tracks, an older 
building flanked by light poles with an eagle holding a serpent atop a nopal cactus 
hosts foreign dignitaries and English as a Second Language classes.  In January 2004, 
with assistance from the FEDECMI, the state government of Michoacán purchased 
the building located at 1638 Blue Island Avenue for the first Casa Michoacán.  This 
space has become an exemplar michoacános hope to reproduce in other areas 
wherever there is a critical mass of michoacanos, such as Nevada, Texas, and 
California.   
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 As a junction where all types of institutionalized transnationalism 
(sociocultural, economic, and political) meet, the Casa Michoacán embodies the 
transnational state.  The Casa Michoacán is a place where FEDECMI and the state 
government of Michoacán hope to foster migrant leadership and activism.  Several 
migration reform mobilizations started at the Casa Michoacán.  Additionally, the 
Casa Michoacán is a place where the state government focuses on building permanent 
dialogue between migrants and governmental authorities to “advance the migrant 
agenda” (FEDECMI:2007).  This space is also home to educational efforts of the state 
(including distance learning and English as a Second Language), and a migrant 
welcome center and service provider referral point.  On the sociocultural level, Casa 
Michoacán promotes artistic and cultural expressions of migrant michoacanos in the 
United States.  Finally, this space allows the state government to encourage the 
articulation of michoacano culture, while also promoting investment, tourism, and 
development in Michoacán to “diminish migration from…communities of origin” 
(ibid.).  Here Michoacán governs–in a benevolent, yet often ambiguous, way that 
many migrants had never seen in Michoacán–más allá de las fronteras.  
 
Conclusion 
 Despite michoacano migrants’ long history of transnational migration, the 
transnational state of Michoacán is still in its infancy.  One may question if it will 
persist.  Its short history of institutionalized activities may cause one to doubt its 
continuation. While many of Michoacán’s transnational policies and programs 
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directed at its migrants abroad date to Cárdenas’ governorship, this does not mean the 
state’s activities and interest are fleeting or anomalous.  In Mexico, the hallmark 
testimony to any policy or legislation’s resilience is if it spans more than one sexenio.  
Michoacán’s current transnational policies not only began before Cárdenas’ term, 
which commenced in 2002, but they have become increasingly more institutionalized, 
empowered, and far-reaching.   
 However, there are several aspects of migrant participation that prove 
Michoacán has not fully established itself in the transnational game.  If remittances 
are a measure of confidence, michoacano migrants may be showing signs of losing 
confidence in the state.  Even though Michoacán continues to receive more than 10 
percent of the country’s total remittances, the first quarter of 2007 compared to the 
first quarter of 2006 has witnessed a drastic decrease, over 5 percent, in remittances to 
Michoacán (Migration Policy Institute 2007:1).   
 It is possible that the state’s focus on economic projects has made its motives 
too transparent to migrants.  Political and sociocultural activities essentially serve to 
make migrants feel like rightful michoacanos so they will support development in the 
state by continuing to send money home.  The state government highly proclaims the 
strides of the 3x1 para Migrantes program but glosses over the importance of 
sociocultural activities.  
 What does the transnational state of Michoacán mean for michoacano 
migrants?  There are positive and negative implications of the growth of the state’s 
transnational actions.  In one respect, the state is taking over migrant-created 
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transnational social spaces.  Migrants who have seen themselves as independent 
actors now are faced with the reality that their home government has crossed the 
border with them.  Migrant innovations, such as matching programs and other 
pioneering ways of dealing with living transnational lives, are co-opted by the state 
for its own end.  So migrants now find themselves entrenched in bureaucracy to carry 
out activities that the state had only until recently overlooked.   
 The transnational state, however, could quite possibly play a greater role in 
ameliorating the problems associated with migration.  While the Michoacán 
government does offer legal aid to michoacano migrants and their families, a more 
concerted effort to promote migration and ease the strain of undocumented migrants 
is necessary.   
 Jennifer Gordon (2007) advocates the creation of transnational labor 
citizenship.  She reviews labor union practices and United States guest worker 
programs and offers transnational labor citizenship as a suggestion to reduce the 
problem of undocumented immigrants.  Aside from addressing the push-factors that 
motivate migration, Gordon believes that one way to mitigate the problems associated 
with an “oversupply of workers seeking so-called low-skilled jobs in the United 
States” is to reformulate how we think of unions and immigration.  She proposes a  
new immigration status, “transnational labor citizenship,” which would entitle 
the holder to come and go freely between the sending country and the United 
States, and to work in the United States without restriction.  The transnational 
labor citizenship regime would be the product of a binational public/private 
collaboration….It would be brought into being and governed by a 
combination of negotiations between the United States and Mexico, unilateral 
regulation by both governments, and the engagement of a network of 
nongovernmental workers organizations operating across borders, 
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membership in one of which would be precondition for obtaining a visa (ibid.: 
563).   
 
These networks’ mission would be to demand just workplaces: fair wages and 
adequate working conditions.   
 Gordon realizes that such a comprehensive plan would be a drastic change in 
immigration and labor policy in the United States and offers “micro-experiments” to 
test the plausibility of transnational labor citizenship.  She believes that the Mexican 
government has the latitude to shape guest worker programs.  One way to do this is 
by state governments taking “direct responsibility for recruitment [of guest workers], 
eliminating exploitative labor contractors” (ibid.:572).     
 There is, in fact, a precedent for this type of action.  The Mexican federal 
government is the sole contractor for the Canadian guest worker program.  On the 
state-level, during the Bracero Program, states had a larger role to play in the guest 
worker recruitment and emigration policy than they do today.  However, various state 
migration institutes have been involved in recruitment recently.   
 Michoacán would do well to pursue the implementation of Gordon’s ideas for 
transnational labor citizenship.  The state would be able to choose those citizens most 
in need.  For example, in choosing migrants for the Canadian guest worker program, 
Zacatecas chose those with the “lowest education levels, the largest families and the 
fewest assets” (ibid.:573).  Fitting with Michoacán’s intentions of looking out for its 
migrants, the implementation of transnational labor citizenship would allow the state 
to do more than mere damage control, as it seems to do now.14  Gordon believes 
government authority could be exercised  
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to mandate membership in a transnational labor organization as a prerequisite 
for applying for a visa through the state agency, on the grounds that the 
interests of Mexico and its citizens were best served by sending migrants with 
a watchdog on their shoulder (ibid.). 
 
If Michoacán were to implement this policy, its position as a transnational state would 
have greater clout with migrants and employers in the United States as well.  The 
state would have a stronger voice in dealing with abuses against its migrants and in 
salary negotiations.  This would certainly be beneficial to the state--as preserving and 
increasing remittances is a top concern--and migrants.   
 Migration from Michoacán is unlikely to ever fully stop.  A primary goal of 
the transnational state of Michoacán is to promote transnational activities to further 
development within the state, in hope of stemming the need to migrate.  If Mexican 
federal policies continue to leave state governments in destitute situations, Michoacán 
will undoubtedly continue to track its migrants to assuage its state of affairs.   
 Ultimately, however, the decision is that of the migrants’ working and living 
abroad.  Having moved from Michoacán to pursue their own dreams, they can decide 
if they want to be transnational Michoacán citizens.  Partaking of the transnational 
activities is voluntary and, as things stand now, Michoacán can preside over those 
who live abroad only if they so choose.  If the state government decides, however, to 
implement a transnational labor citizenship program, more michoacanos may choose 
to sacrifice their relative autonomy for greater safety, better working conditions, 
higher pay, and a secure legal status in the United States.       
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Notes 
 
                                                
1 López Castro (2003:25) uses the term “diaspora” in a loose sense, claiming that 
there is a critical mass of michoacano migrants who construct their identities in 
reference to home.  Diasporic culture hinges, he claims, on what is yearned for – “the 
myth of history wrapped in bright paper, invented traditions, and imagined 
communities.” 
2 Michoacanos’ conspicuous use of the image of the migratory monarch butterfly, 
which winters in the mountainous central region of the state, is striking.  
3 This scenario is based on my personal contacts in Fort Morgan, Colorado, and 
Sasaki (2006). 
4 Trusted fictive kin.  Traditionally, a compadre and comadre baptize your child(ren); 
however, today there are padrinos for graduations, weddings, and any costly 
celebration that would benefit from the strengthening of social bonds and spreading 
cost across a number of people.  I have attended a wedding that had more than 50 
padrinos (who become the couple’s compadres), which effectively bolstered 
relationships and secured future reciprocity. 
5 “Not from here, not from there.”  This phrase has been used by various Mexican 
musicians and artists who have reflected on the ambiguous nature of “belonging” for 
transmigrants.  Examples include the infamous India Maria’s comedy film and L.A. 
corrido-rapper Jae-P’s song, both entitled “Ni de aquí, ni de allá.” 
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6 For a Mexican example, see “Mexico En La Sangre: Anoranzas De Mi Pueblo” 
(Fonovisa, 8 different DVDs).  In addition to an array of landscapes, music, and 
geographically unique festivals, these films feature presidentes municipals (Mexican 
equivalents to something between a mayor and a county commissioner), reminding 
paisanos to not forget their roots and to come back to visit or vacation. 
7 The literature points to Mexico, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Brazil, El Salvador, and the Philippines, as countries that have institutionalized 
transnational policies to a great degree. 
8 Most scholars usually refer to “transnational states” but to abate confusion, I will 
refer to “nation-state” when I mean a country’s civil government and “state” when I 
mean the subnational state government, e.g., Michoacán government, Kansas 
government. 
9 In 1992, Salinas de Gortari instigated agrarian reform, lifting many restrictions on 
ejido (communal) land, which since its inception, in 1917, could not be sold or 
privately owned.  Many farmers have sold their ejido land to large agrobusinesses 
who have the capacity and capital to efficiently utilize the land.  Those farmers who 
have resisted selling their lands are unable to compete with the production of these 
businesses and have had to consider other options for survival.  These other options 
have included selling the rural ejido and migrating to do other agricultural work, 
migrating to Mexico’s cities for nonagricultural work or migrating to the United 
States (Schulz 1996: 145). 
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10 Salinas built on de la Madrid’s rhetoric, saying “La modernización de México 
avanzará por el camino de la descentralización.  La fortaleceremos….para ampliar 
la democracia” (The modernization of Mexico will advance by way of 
decentralization.  We will fortify it to extend democracy) (Salinas in Rodríguez 1993: 
134).  
11 A defining moment in PRI’s relationship with migrants abroad came in 1988. 
Opposition candidate Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas campaigned in California and gave PRI 
candidate Salinas reason to believe he might not win.  In fact, Salinas’s victory was 
tainted with allegations of fraud.   
12 CONAPO’s Migration Intensity Index is a comprehensive measure of Mexico-
United States migration that takes into account the percentage of remittance-receiving 
households, the percentage of households with migrants in the United States, the 
percentage of households with circular migrants, and the percentage of houses with 
returning migrants from the United States (all within the last five years). 
13 One cannot discount the importance of “completion” in the Mexican context.  In a 
country where each new sexenio reveals instances of unfinished projects and 
corruption, citizens rarely trust that politicians or political partie will complete what 
they claim.  Over the last three years, I have been in Michoacán and other parts of 
Mexico during elections; campaign literature is filled with “voy a cumplir” (I will 
fulfill) rhetoric.  Migrants working abroad would have heightened anxiety that the 
projects that they are essentially funding are not completed.   
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14 Michoacán’s Instituto Michoacano de los Migrantes en el Extranjero assists with 
Social Security checks not received, worker rights violations, and the transfer of 
murder victims. 
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